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Summary 
The problem of ineffective policing still persists in post-colonial Africa and as a result, both 
donors and governments are seeking non-state alternatives or complements to the state 
apparatuses. These alternatives include private sector provision, donor-driven interventions 
and community-based or community-driven crime prevention practices. There is no shortage 
of community-based crime prevention (CBCP) practices in Africa and they come in a variety 
of forms and models: neighbourhood watches, vigilantes, religious and ethnic militias, and 
neighbourhood guards. However, the effectiveness of CBCP practices is still a subject of 
controversy despite the widespread prevalence of these practices. This study looks at the 
effectiveness of CBCP practices, considers possible reasons for their effectiveness or 
ineffectiveness, and on the basis of the research, makes some policy recommendations. 
 
 
Keywords: Community participation, community associations, communitisation, community-
based crime prevention, trust in government, trust in police, social capital 
 
 
Ayobami Ojebode is the Head of Department of Communication and Language Arts at 
Ibadan. His expertise is in Media Studies, Research Methods, Violence and Political 
Systems.   
 
Babatunde Raphael Ojebuyi is a lecturer at Ibadan and conducts research in Media 
Studies, Reading as Communication, and Development Communication.  
 
Ngozi. J. Onyechi is a lecturer at Ibadan. She specialises in Media Studies, and 
Development Communication with special focus on Governance, Youth and Women Health.  
 
Oyewole Oladapo is a doctoral student in the Department of Communication and Language 
Arts, University of Ibadan. His areas of interest are Social Media and Activism, Political 
Journalism/Communication and Development.   
 
Obasanjo J. Oyedele is a doctoral student in the Department of Communication and 
Language Arts, University of Ibadan. His areas of interest are Development Communication, 
Climate Change Communication and Media Studies.   
 
Israel. A. Fadipe is a doctoral student in the Department of Communication and Language 
Arts, University of Ibadan. His research interests are on Gender and Cultural Studies.  
 
*All the authors are affiliated to University of Ibadan, Nigeria.  
  
 4 
Contents 
 
 Summary, keywords, author notes 3 
 Acknowledgements  6 
 Acronyms    6 
 Executive summary  7 
 Introduction   9 
 
1 Constructing explanations for the (in)effectiveness of CBCP 10 
 
2  Research design and methods 12 
 
3  The regional picture  14 
 3.1 Crime rate and crime rate trends in Africa 14 
 3.2 State policing and crime prevention efforts in Africa 15 
 3.3 Community-based crime prevention practices in Africa  17 
  3.3.1  CBCP in Tanzania 18 
  3.3.2  CBCP in South Sudan 18 
  3.3.3  CBCP in South Africa 18 
 
4  Models, practices and reasons for CBCP effectiveness 19 
 4.1 Community-based crime prevention practices in Ibadan, Nigeria 19 
 4.2 A mix of models  20 
 4.3 Communitisation as the overarching strategy 21 
  4.3.1  Communitisation of personal spaces and problems 21 
  4.3.2  Communitisation of abdicated state roles and duties 24 
 4.4 Effectiveness of the CBCP practices 26 
  4.4.1  Social capital 28 
  4.4.2  Communication infrastructure 29 
  4.4.3  Community participation 31 
 4.5 Explaining ineffectiveness: a comparison of two CBCP practices 32 
  4.5.1  History, culture and the role of multiple lordships 34 
 
5 Discussion    36 
 
6 Conclusions, policy implications and recommendations 37 
 
 Annexes 
 Annex 1 Questionnaire for first round of data collection in 18 communities 39 
 Annex 2 Questionnaire for second round of data collection 42 
 Annex 3 Instrument for third round of data collection – interview  
  questions and FGD questions 43 
 Annex 4  Assessment of quality of the evidence from existing studies 51 
 
 References   53 
 
  
 5 
Tables 
Table 4.1 Residents’ perception of mutual care and cooperation among their 
 Neighbours 29  
Table 4.2  Residents’ assessment of sufficiency and relevance of information  
 exchange in the community 30 
Table 4.3  Communication infrastructure in the communities 31 
Table 4.4  Residents’ level of community participation 31 
Table 4.5  A comparison of CBCP performances in Sasa and Oja’ba 33 
 
 
 
Figures 
Figure 3.1 The 2012 homicide rates by region (per 100,000 inhabitants) 14 
Figure 4.1 Citizens’ perceptions of safety of their communities (n=240) 26 
Figure 4.2 Most difficult problem in the neighbourhood as identified by  
residents (n=240)  27                                                       
Figure 4.3  Percentage considering specific criminal acts as serious problem  
in their neighbourhood (n=240) 27                                                     
Figure 4.4 Residents’ perception of trust among their neighbours 28 
Figure 4.5  Social capital, community participation and communication  
 infrastructure and CBCP effectiveness 32 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 6 
Acknowledgements 
 
The authors wish to acknowledge the support of Practical Action Consulting that provided the 
grant for the Evidence and Lessons from Latin America (ELLA) project, of which this 
publication is a product. We also appreciate the efforts of our research assistants who 
participated in different waves of data collection for the study. Also, we acknowledge the 
support we received from the Nigeria Police and community association leaders in the 
course of the research. We equally consider as immense the contribution of M. O. Babajide 
who led the research secretariat for the Ibadan ELLA project that produced this paper.  
 
Acronyms 
 
ACLED Armed Conflict Location and Event Data 
AU African Union 
CBCP Community-Based Crime Prevention 
CIT Communication Infrastructure Theory 
DFID Department for International Development 
EFCC Economic and Financial Crimes Commission 
FRSC Federal Road Safety Commission 
ICPC Independent Corrupt Practices Commission 
IRIN Integrated Regional Information Network 
NDLEA National Drug Law Enforcement Agency 
PCRC Police-Community Relations Committee 
SJG Security, Justice and Growth 
UNDP United Nations Development Programme 
UNODC United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 
 
 
 
 
 7 
Executive summary 
The crisis in the criminal justice system, especially in African nations, has been the subject 
of academic and policy debates with the consensus being that state apparatuses alone are 
incapable of improving the crime situation. As Killingray (1986) explains, the adoption and 
extension of indirect rule in the British colonies, especially in Africa, created a phenomenon 
where the British tactically retreated from close or effective control of their territories. 
Policing was thin and often non-existent over much of the African empire and African 
'traditional' rulers had responsibility for the maintenance of law and order. The problem of 
ineffective policing still persists in post-colonial Africa. As a result, both donors and 
governments are seeking non-state alternatives or complements to the state apparatuses. 
These alternatives include private sector provision, donor-driven interventions and 
community-based or community-driven crime prevention practices. 
 
In Africa, there is no shortage of community-based crime prevention (CBCP) practices. They 
come in a variety of forms and models: neighbourhood watches, vigilantes, religious and 
ethnic militias, and neighbourhood guards. However, whereas the failure of the criminal 
justice system and formal crime prevention is hardly debatable, the effectiveness of 
community-based crime prevention (CBCP) practices in Africa is still a subject of 
controversy despite the widespread prevalence of these practices. In this study, we ask: how 
effective are these CBCP practices and what explains their effectiveness or ineffectiveness? 
 
We conceptualised effectiveness in terms of citizens’ perception of their safety and of the 
crime level in their community. We also included the extent to which they attribute these two 
to the CBCP in their communities. This measure has important limitations but given the 
problems of crime data sourcing and fidelity in Africa, we reluctantly left out official measures 
of crime rate reduction as an index of effectiveness of CBCP, focusing rather on the 
experiences and expressions of the citizens who daily bear the brunt of crimes. 
 
Through a combination of descriptive and small-N comparative case study designs, we 
collected primary data in four stages in a total of 18 communities in Ibadan, Nigeria. 
Descriptive quantitative and qualitative analyses and process tracing showed that CBCP 
practices were widely prevalent in Ibadan and were driven by community development 
associations. These practices combined elements of different non-state models such as paid 
security provisioning, vigilantism and neighbourhood watches. The communities also work 
closely with the police. Most residents described their communities as safe and crime levels 
as low. Importantly, most of them attributed this to their community’s CBCP practices. Social 
capital, community participation and communication infrastructure were high in the studied 
communities. These may be the factors that make it possible for the communities to 
organise themselves in the first instance. However, we found these factors to be equally 
high in both effective CBCP communities and ineffective CBCP communities. This, 
therefore, makes it implausible to argue that these factors explain the effectiveness of 
CBCP. 
 
What makes a CBCP effective is the ability of the community development association to 
apply what we call the communitisation strategy, a strategy that plays out in three forms. 
First, the associations driving the CBCP declared nearly everything, including private 
spaces, as subject to community inspection and oversight. CBCPs could be intrusive of 
private spaces and might even be dictatorial. However, citizens did not mind this intrusion, 
claiming that intrusion for the sake of security was better than privacy with insecurity. 
Secondly, community associations also communitised some of the private concerns and 
problems of their members, shielding them from the complications that arise in Nigeria each 
time a citizen has to report a matter to the police. The association thus stood in, in the place 
of the concerned or aggrieved individual members. Third, community associations also 
 8 
communitised the role of the state: they stepped in to fund the police by supplying their 
vehicles with fuel, constructing police posts, repairing police patrol vans and giving police 
officers monetary incentives so that the communities can be well patrolled and protected. 
They also supplied intelligence and facilitated the arrest of suspects. The officers 
reciprocated by patrolling regularly and responding rapidly to distress calls from the 
community associations. 
 
A comparison of two CBCP practices – one effective, the other not – showed that 
effectiveness depended on the ability of the community associations to deploy the strategy 
summed up above. Through an exploration of the contexts, we discovered that a 
conjuncture of cultural and contextual factors impacted on the ability of the community 
associations to apply those three strategies. 
 
Policies seeking to strengthen CBCP must (i) support communitisation strategies and  
(ii) create a delicate balance between protecting citizens’ rights without weakening the 
strength of the community associations. An approach that seeks citizens’ interpretation of 
their rights and privileges is important in drafting such policies. Policies also need to 
recognise that in some contexts even such strategies will have limited efficacy. 
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Introduction 
Decades after African nations obtained political independence, most of them have yet to 
come up with criminal justice systems that work. Crime rates are high and state apparatuses 
appear to be incapable of bringing them down. A recent report by the United Nations Office 
on Drugs and Crimes (UNODC 2013) shows that Africa occupies one of the topmost 
positions in global crime prevalence. With a homicide rate of 12.5 per 100,000 population, 
compared with the global average of 6.2, Africa ranks behind only the Americas in homicide 
prevalence. Not only this, whereas crime rates seem to be stable or falling in Europe, they 
are rising in Africa (Institute for Security Studies and Africa Check 2014). 
 
African governments and international donors are aware of this failure of the state criminal 
justice system and are actively seeking out alternatives or complements from the non-state 
sector. As Baker (2009) and Jenkins (2013) observe, this is a diverse sector including actors 
such as traditional rulers, informal levels of government, religious organisations, community-
based organisations, and youth groups, most of whom operate at the community level. The 
activities of these actors in non-state sectors are what we call community-based crime 
prevention (CBCP) practices. 
These practices take numerous forms and are widespread. Forms of CBCP include ethnic 
militias, religious militias, vigilante groups, community-paid neighbourhood guards, and 
volunteer neighbourhood watches, operating in different African countries. Specific 
examples include the Oodua People’s Congress in Nigeria, the South African vigilante 
groups (Baker 2002) and South African street courts (Burman and Sharf 1990). While some 
are state-initiated and/or state-supported such as the Sierra Leonean Partnership Boards 
(Baker 2008), the Sungusungu in Tanzania (Fleisher 2000; Cross 2013; Cross 2014) and 
the nyumba kumi in Kenya, others, such as those found in most Nigerian neighbourhoods, 
are entirely owned and controlled by the community. Some are initiated and/or sponsored by 
donors (Brogden 2005; Schultz and Tabanico 2007). Kenya resorted to community based 
crime prevention methods after the Westgate incident (Kivoto 2014). In Ghana, the police 
service adopted a community based system para-militaristic in its approach (Crews and 
Crews 2007). In the view of Denney (2015), these widely varied practices can be located at 
some point along the spectrum between totally informal and totally formal policing. 
 
However, whereas the failure of the criminal justice system and formal crime prevention is 
hardly debatable, the effectiveness of community-based crime prevention (CBCP) practices 
in Africa is still a subject of controversy despite the widespread prevalence of these 
practices. In this study, we ask: how effective are these CBCP practices and what explains 
their effectiveness or ineffectiveness? 
 
This is an important policy question for a number of reasons. First, starting from 2008, the 
African Union (AU) Security Sector Reform Policy Framework insisted on reforms that are 
marked by the slogan ‘ownership by local communities’ (AU 2013). Second, at the national 
levels and apparently in line with the AU policy framework, African nations are not only 
attempting security sector reforms but are doing so in a fashion that gives recognition to 
non-state, especially community-based, initiatives. For instance, in Kenya, a good part of the 
post-Westgate attack reform was the recourse to community-based crime prevention 
methods especially the Nyumba Kumi initiative (Kivoto 2014). In Ghana, the Ghana Police 
Service is attempting a switch from a ‘para-militaristic philosophy to a more community-
centred approach’ (Crews and Crews 2007).  In Nigeria, in August 2015, the Federal 
Government of Nigeria with funds from three international partners – Ford Foundation, 
MacArthur Foundation and Open Society Foundation – inaugurated a panel to address a 
comprehensive criminal justice reform (Premium Times 2015). Within the same month, the 
Inspector General of Police, the overall police boss, announced that the nation would pursue 
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‘community-driven’ policing more deliberately and systematically in order to ‘tackle the 
inadequate manpower profile in the Nigeria Police Force’ (Channels TV 2015). Within the 
same month, the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation, a victim of oil pipeline vandalism, 
announced that it would adopt ‘community based policing to protect the vast network of oil 
and gas pipelines in Nigeria’ (Okafor 2015). In Uganda, government began in 2014 the 
recruitment of 11 million crime preventers. These, according to government, are to be 
volunteers who will be trained in community-based crime prevention and work with the 
police. As at June 2015, about a million of such people have been trained and have begun 
work. This came in the same year that the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 
sponsored a CBCP project in Karamoja, Uganda, which trained hundreds of police officers in 
community policing and held security dialogues with over 4,600 citizens (UNDP 2014; 
Ugandan Parliament 2015). 
 
Third, studies of CBCP show that they can have both positive and negative outcomes. Nolte 
(2007), working on the Oodua People’s Congress in Southwest Nigeria, observes that 
community strategies were effective in fighting criminals, restoring law and order, and even 
championing change, and Baker (2008) reports that in post-war Sierra Leone, Police Local 
Partnership Boards helped to overcome mistrust of government and the police. On the other 
hand, it has also been shown that while CBCP may be effective in reducing petty crime and 
even homicides and armed robbery, in many cases they replace these crimes with another, 
notably mob justice and abuse of citizens’ rights (Baker 2002; Alemika and Chukwuma 
2004; Brogden and Nijhar 2005). In addition to this, some community-based crime 
prevention isolates segments of the community – foreigners, those from another ethnic 
group – which can provoke the use of violence against them (Baker 2008). The question 
thus has to be asked about the conditions that make CBCP effective or ineffective. 
 
1 Constructing explanations for the 
(in)effectiveness of CBCP 
Community-based crime prevention is based on faith in the power of the collective. For a 
collective effort to produce intended results, the individuals making up this collective must 
work together; there must be tangible but also intangible resources; and finally there must be 
opportunities and avenues for the on-going exchange of ideas. In that order, these refer to 
participation, social capital and communication infrastructure. 
 
In development studies, the concept of participation, specifically community participation, 
has been the subject of robust scholarly disquisitions. Worried by the growing misuse of the 
term, development scholars began to specify what participation truly means. Arnstein’s 
(1969) ladder of participation is most likely the first disambiguation of that concept. Arnstein 
held that several activities lumped up as participation were rather non-participatory and she 
categorised participation into an eight-rung ladder at the bottom of which is manipulation and 
at the topmost level of which is citizen control. Others have attempted to improve on 
Arnstein’s ladder (e.g. Burns, Hambleton and Hoggett 1994; Wilcox 1999) and come up with 
different sizes of the ladder. Cornwall (2008), however, goes beyond categorisation into the 
deeper issues of who is participating and who is not, ‘in what and for whose benefit’. 
Literature on community participation in CBCP not only shows variations in the levels of 
participation in different communities but also suggests that where participation is narrow 
and passive, CBCP has a greater tendency to be ineffective (Brogden and Nijhar 2005; 
Dammert 2005). 
 
Putnam (2000) argues that the most general forms of social capital are trust and social 
participation. Coleman (1988) describes social capital in terms of the influence of informal 
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and horizontal local social relationships, as well as formal hierarchical relationships, on a 
given setting. Specifically, it refers to the set of rules, networks, values and organisations 
that promote trust, mutual support and cooperation in a society. 
 
With reference to crime prevention, many studies have found that crime prevention efforts 
are effective - that is, fear of crime and crime rates actually drop - where there is high social 
capital and high collective efficacy (Maxwell, Garner and Skogan 2011; Rukus and Warner 
2012; Ansari 2013; Abdullah, Marzbali, Bahauddin and Tilaki 2015). However, a few studies 
are either inconclusive about the connection between these variables or suggest that the 
relationship varies from one community to another (Nero 2010). 
 
Communication infrastructure refers to the whole array of communication facilities, practices, 
forums and opportunities that are available to a community for its members to ‘story-tell’ their 
experiences and concerns. Studies on community communication and communication 
infrastructure have been summed up into a coherent theoretical framework known as the 
Communication Infrastructure Theory (CIT). 
 
CIT, roughly summarised, ‘distinguishes local communities in terms of whether they have 
communication resources that can be activated to construct community, thereby enabling 
collective action for common purpose’ (Kim and Ball-Rokeach 2006). Studies employing CIT 
suggest that civic engagement and community participation could be greater where the 
communication infrastructure is rich but they are inconclusive on the causal pathway that 
this takes. Richness encompasses the questions of what communication infrastructure is 
available [variety and nature] and who uses them and how often. 
 
Explaining the effectiveness or otherwise of crime prevention must also take into 
consideration factors of population density and poverty. While one might expect that high 
density populations provide human surveillance that then discourages crime, especially 
property theft, most studies suggest that crime rates rise with population density. On the one 
hand, dense populations are difficult to organise for effective community interventions; on 
the other, dense populations are difficult to police. It is also the case that dense populations 
make more property available for possible theft (Nolan III 2004; Harries 2006; Shichor, 
Decker and O’Brien 2006). 
 
The link between poverty and crime has also been established in the literature. As far back 
as 1949, Shaw established the correlation between economic instability and crime rates. 
Studies that follow largely agree on this as well (Shaw 1949; Hsieh and Pugh 1993; Ouimet 
2012; Lightowlers 2015). 
 
The foregoing explanations informed both our hypothesis and research design. Our central 
research question is: how effective are CBCP practices and what explains their 
effectiveness or ineffectiveness? We hypothesised that communities whose CBCP are 
effective have wider community participation, greater social capital, greater collective 
efficacy, and better communication infrastructure than those communities whose CBCP are 
ineffective. We control for the role of poverty and population density through case selection. 
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2  Research design and methods 
As a way of setting the scene, we briefly review the regional evidence on community-based 
crime prevention (CBCP) practices before going into the detailed case study in Nigeria. 
Regional evidence across Africa shows that the practice of community-based crime 
prevention (CBCP) is not only widespread but also varied in its form and structure. 
Importantly, the practice also turns out a variety of outcomes: while some are considered 
effective, others are considered ineffective while yet others produce inconclusive outcomes. 
 
An effective CBCP is conceptualised as one that produces an actual reduction in crime rates 
and results in citizens’ favourable perception of their safety. Whereas citizens’ perception of 
their own safety can be measured through a survey, studying actual reduction in crime rates 
is problematic. This is because, very often, crime rate statistics are based on police records, 
but as Bruce (2010) observes, police records in Africa ‘cannot be relied on as an indicator of 
trends in violent crime’ for several reasons. This is because in many African countries, 
citizens do not report crimes because of fear of getting into trouble with the police; police 
records are not properly kept and the few that are kept are declared ‘classified documents’ 
not for public or researchers’ access. In addition to this, police records are sometimes 
manipulated to give an exaggerated picture of crime rate reduction and success in official 
crime prevention efforts (Bruce 2010). Therefore, the effectiveness of CBCP in this study 
was determined based on two sources. The first source was the views of the citizens, 
community leaders and the police obtained through interviews, focus group discussions and 
surveys. The second source was our participant observation at community security meetings 
and community security patrols. 
 
This could be interpreted as a major limitation of the study especially when one views 
citizens’ perceptions as being at variance with reality, and that reality has ascendance over 
perception. However, the literature shows that citizens’ perception of security is important. It 
very much influences how they view government and its responsiveness to citizens’ needs; 
indeed whether they support government at all. 
 
To understand whether and why CBCP practices were effective or ineffective in the selected 
communities, we combined descriptive large-N surveys and quasi-experimental small-N 
comparative case study designs. While a Large-N survey is a suitable design when it comes 
to analysis of larger data, a small-N case study is case-oriented and suitable for tracing 
causal relationship (Emmenegger, Schraff and Walter 2014). Based largely on Mills’ method 
of similarity or difference, small-N case study designs allow researchers to make causal 
explanations through spatial, longitudinal or dynamic comparisons of carefully selected 
cases (Gerring 2012). This is a particularly useful method for policy-engaged research 
because it combines the strength of experimental research with the value of observing 
citizens in their real-life contexts thus providing a platform strong enough to make credible 
policy suggestions. 
 
We applied a large-N survey method to afford us the opportunity of harvesting a diversity of 
views which is important in such a multi-ethnic and multicultural city. However, surveys 
alone would have been inadequate to study a people with a strong oral tradition, who live in 
a string of interconnected clusters. These tradition and settlement patterns, therefore, 
necessitated the adoption of ethnographic methods and small-N case studies. 
 
The study was conducted in Ibadan, Nigeria because community-driven CBCP is prevalent 
in the city; the city straddles the wide spectrum of socio-economic statuses and population 
densities in Nigeria. It is multi-ethnic and multinational, therefore providing the opportunity to 
harness a diversity of views and practices. Historically, Ibadan metamorphosed from a war 
camp situated beside the Savannah—Eba-Odan. It was founded by a group of warriors led 
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by Lagelu. The place was originally a sort of ‘no man’s land serving as an informal boundary 
between the inhabitants of the savannah (Ọdan) who were the Oyo people, and the forest 
(Igbo) dwellers, the Ijebu and Egba’ (Layonu, Okosun, Kehinde and Ishola, cited by 
Ademowo 2015).Besides, empirical evidence has shown that Ibadan has high incidents of 
motor park violence (Ademowo 2015), and like Johannesburg in South Africa, Ibadan has a 
‘history of organic growth and change and high crime rates’, with both cities having a high 
prevalence of neighbourhood enclosures to check crimes (Fabiyi 2006).With some measure 
of certainty, the findings of studies based in Ibadan, therefore, should present a credible 
platform for formulating policies that might work in similar socio-cultural contexts. 
 
For the first round of data collection, we divided the city into two vast swathes based on 
population density, and from each swathe we chose nine communities. We then conducted 
a survey in those 18 communities in order to assess the effectiveness of their CBCPs. In 
that first survey, we asked community members to describe their sense of safety, the 
activities of their neighbourhood association in charge of the CBCP, the level of crime in 
their neighbourhood, the person to whom they would rather report crime, and the connection 
between the level of safety and the activities of their neighbourhood associations. This led 
us to classify the 18 communities into two strata: communities with effective CBCP and 
those with ineffective CBCP. 
 
From each stratum, we selected three communities. Although the second survey was not 
intended to be a comparison of these groups of communities, we thought it wise to spread 
the selection of communities across performance levels of CBCP, socio-economic profiles 
and population density in order to provide a diversity of views and experiences. The six 
selected communities were Agbowo, Laaniba, Oladele II, Old Bodija, Onireke and Sasa. 
 
In each of the selected communities, we investigated community participation, social capital, 
and communication infrastructure. From each community, 40 adults responded to the survey 
totalling 240 adults. These were selected through systematic random sampling of each fifth 
house. In each house, the household head or, in his/her absence, the first volunteering adult 
was selected. Survey data was analysed descriptively and through correlation. After this, we 
interviewed community leaders and conducted a focus group discussion with residents in 
each community. 
 
The last round of data collection was qualitative. For this we selected two communities both 
of which had a low socio-economic profile and were densely populated but varied on the 
effectiveness of their CBCP -Sasa and Oja’ba. This pair helped us to hold both poverty and 
population density constant. Population density and socio-economic status have been 
shown to affect the effectiveness of crime prevention efforts: crime prevention efforts 
produce better outcomes where both population density and poverty are low. The selection 
thus enabled us to rule out these two variables as possible explanations for the variation in 
the effectiveness of CBCP in the selected communities. 
 
We conducted two focus group discussions with residents of each community, with 
discussants numbering between eight and ten for each discussion session. We conducted 
in-depth interviews with the chairs of the resident associations and the police boss in each of 
the stations that serviced the two communities. We participated in six monthly meetings of 
the resident associations and in two security patrols with association members. 
 
Through process tracing, we established a causal pathway that explains why CBCP works in 
one community but not in the other, even though these two have in common all the factors 
that matter. By examining socio-cultural and other contextual factors, we concluded that 
poverty and population density, as well as economic and demographic factors such as 
unemployment and youth population, were rather implausible explanations for the 
effectiveness or otherwise of CBCP practices.
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3 The regional picture 
3.1 Crime rates and crime rate trends in Africa 
Official and other statistics show that the crime rate in Africa is high. Of nearly half a million 
homicides committed globally in 2012, only 5 per cent occurred in Europe; 31 per cent 
occurred in Africa; just next to the Americas’ 36 per cent (UNODC 2013). Numbeo (2015) 
ranked six African countries as among the twenty nations with the highest crime rates in the 
world. These include South Sudan, South Africa, Nigeria, Kenya and Libya. When homicide 
rates per 100,000 population were calculated, Africa again came second to the Americas. 
For example, statistics from the victimisation surveys in Africa (UNODC 2010) revealed that 
in Rwanda, during the period 2003-2008, out of the number of crime cases reported, 68.9 
per cent were crimes at the household level while 31.1 per cent were personal/individual 
cases. In other African countries, such as Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Egypt, Tanzania and 
Uganda, robbery, corruption, consumer fraud, sexual assault, kidnapping, and property 
crimes involving car hijacking, theft of livestock, and burglary were prevalent, although to 
varying degrees. 
 
As indicated by UNODC, out of 437,000 (almost half a million) deaths caused by intentional 
homicide globally in 2012, more than a third (36 per cent) happened in the Americas, 31 per 
cent occurred in Africa, 28 per cent in Asia, and just 5 per cent in Europe (UNODC 2014). 
Figure 3.1 shows that Africa has the second homicide rate among the regions of the world. 
 
Figure 3.1: The 2012 homicide rates by region (per 100,000 inhabitants) 
 
Own Elaboration 
Source: United Nations Office on Drug and Crime (UNODC 2014) 
 
The world average for the period is 6.2 per 100,000 inhabitants but the African rate is twice 
that (UNODC 2014). Other forms of crime, such as arson, child trafficking, drug abuse, drug 
trafficking, commercial crimes, kidnapping and illicit firearms possession and use also 
plague African nations in different proportions (Harrendorf, Heiskanen and Malby 2010; 
UNODC 2014).  
 
More worrisome is the fact that crime rates seem to be increasing rather than decreasing. 
UNODC (2014) reports increases in homicide rates in Eastern Africa with Kenya and 
Uganda in the lead since 2004. In South Sudan, there have been high levels of firearm 
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availability, and this situation has increased the lethality associated with cattle rustling, 
especially in the Wunlit Triangle—a region that witnessed one of the highest homicide rates 
in the world in 2013 at over 60 per 100,000 inhabitants. And, although South Africa 
experienced a steady decrease in homicide rates between 1995 and 2011 of more than  
50 per cent, from 64.9 to 30.0 per 100,000 inhabitants, the country witnessed an increase to 
31 per 100,000 inhabitants in 2012. Since then, the trend has continued to rise. In fact, the 
2013/2014 crime statistics in South Africa show that the country was less safe than it was 
two years earlier. Cases of murder, specifically house robbery, and hijacking, have 
continued to rise in the country. As reported by the South African Police Service, between 
2013 and 2014, the murder rate went up by 5 per cent, with more than 17,000 cases. This 
increase amounts to over 800 cases more than the previous year. Specifically, the average 
number of murders committed each day rose from 45 in 2012/13 to 47 in 2013/14 (South 
Sudan Monitor 2011; Eye Witness News, 2014; Institute for Security Studies and Africa 
Check, 2014;South African Police Service, 2015). 
 
With respect to organised, armed conflict, De Villiers (2015) shows that there was an 
escalation of conflict in Africa in 2014, with five Sub-Saharan countries recording an 
estimated 74 per cent of all deaths related to conflicts on the continent. Data on trends of 
violence and conflict-related fatalities in Africa released by the Armed Conflict Location and 
Event Data Project (ACLED 2015) show that Somalia, Sudan and Nigeria accounted for 26 
per cent, 10 per cent, and 9 per cent respectively of all organised, armed conflicts in Africa in 
2014. This trend shows a continued pattern since 2013, when these countries were 
responsible for approximately 33 per cent, 10 per cent, and 9 per cent, respectively, with 
only Somalia recording a reduction. In 2014, Libya and South Sudan joined the category of 
most violent countries as they accounted for 10 per cent and 8 per cent, respectively, of 
violent conflict in Africa. However, DR Congo, which was high on the list in 2013, recorded a 
reduction in her relative violence rate to 7 per cent of violent conflict in Africa in 2014. In 
Libya, the rate of conflicts tripled (i.e. approximately 500 conflicts in 2014 compared to 160 
conflicts in 2013). The country also witnessed a sharp increase in remote violence tactics 
(i.e. approximately 280 instances in 2014 compared to 110 in 2013) and violence against 
civilians (i.e. approximately 270 instances in 2014, up from 108 instances in 2013).  
 
When riots and protests are not considered, the least violent African countries in 2014 were 
Benin, Botswana, Eritrea, Equatorial Guinea, and Gabon. Nigeria is the deadliest country in 
Africa recording over 29 per cent of all organised, armed conflict-related fatalities in Africa in 
2014, with 6,383 deaths in 2014 (ACLED 2015), largely caused by the insurgency in the 
north east. This is almost twice the number of deaths reported in South Sudan which 
recorded 16 per cent of all organised, armed conflict-related deaths. 
 
The high rate of crime in Africa has been explained as a product of several factors. These 
include political factors such as state fragility and state failure, and historical factors such as 
the history of inter-ethnic and interracial injustices including apartheid. Others are economic 
factors such as unemployment and corruption, and the balloon effect resulting from the 
improved successes of anti-drug law enforcement in Europe and the Caribbean, which are 
said to be responsible for increased drug trafficking in West Africa (UNODC 2007; The 
Economist 2009; Wyler and Cook 2009; UNODC 2015). This, however, is not to suggest that 
African governments are not fighting crime. The next section is an overview of their efforts. 
3.2 State policing and crime prevention efforts in Africa 
Prominent among different measures adopted by African countries to reduce or prevent 
crimes are efforts to establish the rule of law, criminal justice systems and police forces. 
Nigeria, Tanzania, Uganda, South Africa, Kenya and many other countries of Sub-Saharan 
Africa, have long established police forces with crime prevention mandates, among other 
duties (Van Der Spuy and Röntsch 2008). 
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In Nigeria for example, despite proclaimed reforms by successive governments, there has 
been little improvement in crime-fighting efforts (Van Der Spuy and Röntsch 2008). Growing 
allegations of corruption and incompetence in crime fighting have been continually levelled 
against the Nigeria Police (Hills 2008), compelling the government to establish some 
security and anti-corruption agencies such as the Federal Road Safety Commission (FRSC), 
the State Security Service (SSS), the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), 
the National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA), the Independent Corrupt Practices 
and other Related Offences Commission (ICPC), and the Nigeria Security and Civil Defence 
Corps (Odekunle 2004; Obuah 2010). In addition to these, Nigeria has embarked on several 
security programmes and projects. For instance, in collaboration with the United Kingdom’s 
Department for International Development (DFID), Nigeria launched its Security, Justice and 
Growth (SJG) programme in 2002 to address core issues of security and access to justice. 
The programme was successful, ending in 2010 with most of its objectives achieved 
(DFID2010). 
 
In 2008, the government of Ghana signed a US$12.5 million financing agreement with the 
European Commission to enable the Police Service to embark on a massive recruitment 
drive and increase the number of cops on the beat. Also, Ghana’s judicial service rolled out 
aggressive judicial reforms. It adopted court automation, built more law courts, appointed 
more judges and established weekend courts to expedite the pace of justice (Integrated 
Regional Information Networks, IRIN 2008). 
 
South Africa in 1996 established the National Crime Prevention Strategy (NCPS). The 
Strategy was designed to rebuild the Criminal Justice system to ensure appropriate 
sentencing and an effective criminal justice process. It also focused on a public education 
programme, community policing, a victim empowerment programme, and sustained care for 
juveniles, among other objectives (Centre for Justice and Crime Prevention 2015; South 
African Government 2015). However, the campaign failed to achieve its objectives because 
of its many shortcomings (see Masiza and Ntlokonkulu 2002; Newhan 2005; Van Der Spuy 
and Röntsch 2008). In 2009, the South African president promised to boost the police from 
183,000 to 205,000 in three years but there were doubts that this would reduce the South 
African crime rate significantly (The Economist 2009).  
 
State policing in African states has failed to meet the aspirations of citizens because of 
inherent historical, cultural, ideological, economic and political challenges. This failure has its 
roots in the colonial experience of indirect rule, which gave the power to maintain law and 
order in communities to traditional rulers and their agencies (Killingray 1986). With examples 
in Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Kenya and Northern Rhodesia, Killingray (1986) observed that 
under this system, the Native Police Authority or Tribal Messengers under the control of the 
traditional rulers were responsible for the maintenance of law and order, while the 
Government Police Force was a micro establishment with minimal control at the city centres. 
This failure to assume full control eventually culminated in arbitrary rule and the forceful 
migration of some people into other areas. The same method was adopted at independence 
by the countries concerned, although other security bodies were also established with an 
expansion of the police and military. The system did little to prevent fragmentation, as it 
depended on expressions of loyalty centred on regional and communal, rather than on 
national, identity (Marenin 2009). 
 
Over time, this phenomenon has culminated in full blown political and economic crises in 
some African countries, such as Somalia, Sierra Leone, Liberia and Southern Sudan, where 
various interests and ethnic leaders constantly manipulate the weaknesses of the state 
apparatus to establish control. Marenin (2009) has highlighted some basic problems that 
confront the state police in most African countries. These problems, which emanate from the 
historical conditions highlighted above, include the lack of operational and occupational 
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autonomy; weak professional ethics or standards as a result of inherent colonial mentalities; 
a negative public perception of the police as corrupt, brutal and inefficient; the lack of public 
acceptability and legitimacy of the state; abuse of power; weak national identities; lack of 
resources; corruption; and inefficient management. 
 
The continued failure of state agencies to prevent crime is the most likely reason for the 
increasing recourse to non-state actors in Africa. Baker (2010b)  listed these actors to 
include vigilante groups, religious police, ethnic or clan militias, civil defence forces, semi-
commercial anti-crime groups, work-based security groups, local government security 
structures, customary structures, and restorative justice community-based organisations or 
peace committees. To these one should add fully commercial security providers and the 
varieties of crime prevention practices organised informally by communities in Africa. As a 
result, vigilantism and community policing (self-policing) operate in many African States 
alongside and in competition with ineffectual state policing (Hills 2011). 
 
Hills (2011) identified the specific challenges that undermine internal security and limit the 
effectiveness of the state police in some African States. In Uganda, the researcher observed 
that crime detection and prevention are a mirage because most of the police stations do not 
have case files, or even the transport and communication facilities needed for effective 
policing. Training and re-training are substandard, commitment to work is very low as there 
are no programmes for job motivation. 
 
In Ethiopia, the ease with which ordinary citizens have access to guns makes it difficult for 
the police to effectively prevent insecurity. In addition, the fact that police or army posts are 
located far away has made it possible for Islamic fundamentalists in Oromo and parts of 
Somalia to perpetuate religious tensions and banditry. Persistent and increasing 
unemployment, economic stagnation, and poor strategic planning, are grossly affecting the 
effectiveness of state policing.  
 
The researchers observed that Namibia and South Africa (after apartheid) have similar 
problems. Namibia at independence hurriedly adopted the structure and leadership of the 
old South West African Police (SWAPOL) in the new NAMPOL. But this was little more than 
camouflage because in reality the police were grossly under-funded. Officers exhibited low 
morale and high absenteeism because they were not inappropriately trained or promoted. 
The situation was better however in South Africa. 
 
State policing in Somalia is severely affected by politically-motivated ethnic and factional 
militia groups who perpetuate chronic extortion and an economy of plunder using conflict 
and mobilisation. Somalia has a small population of only about 5 million, large expanses of 
land with very long distances between urban areas, scarce resources and ethnic rivalry 
between the North and South, making it difficult for the state to effectively maintain law and 
order. The situation has encouraged the growth of many militia groups that enforce order in 
their respective territories. This fragmentation of control across clans and lineage makes it 
easy for teenagers and young adults to inordinately impose their will and plunder both 
traders and citizens. 
3.3 Community-based crime prevention practices in Africa 
Community-based crime prevention (CBCP) practices are prevalent in Africa, with different 
structures, names, as well as different degrees of state involvement and formalisation. 
Community policing, neighbourhood watches, vigilantes, police partnership boards, are 
some of the names describing the different forms of CBCP in Africa. In the review that 
follows, we focus on three African countries which present an arguably representative 
variety of CBCP in Africa. Tanzania, for instance, has one of the oldest traditional CBCP, the 
Sungusungu. South Sudan is emerging from a prolonged crisis that has stretched its official 
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policing mechanism and capacity beyond the breaking point, while South Africa has high 
crime rates but relatively sophisticated forms of CBCP. 
3.3.1 CBCP in Tanzania 
Tanzania is famous for Sungusungu, an old movement intended to ward off cattle raiding, 
and also for ulinzi shirikishi which is an adaptation of Sungusungu (Cross 2013; Fleisher 
2000; Heald 2000; Michael 2000; Heald 2009). Sungusungu became a state-sponsored 
vigilante form of CBCP in Tanzania after many years of informal existence, whereas ulinzi 
shirikishi is a state concept and idea. While the Tanzanian state has allowed Sungusungu 
groups to codify their own laws and exact their own forms of punishment, ulinzi shirikishi 
operates within the framework of state security law (Cross 2013).  
 
It is on record that during the ‘peak’ period of Sungusungu interventions, in the late 1980s, 
the rates of mugging and robbery dropped in the country by 60 per cent and 72 per cent 
respectively, with a 20 per cent drop in burglaries and a 24 per cent drop in assault cases 
(Shadrack 2000). Cross (2013) notes that although community policing in Tanzania was 
found to facilitate crime prevention and make residents feel safer in their neighbourhoods, it 
was not necessarily more accountable or responsive than state policing. In some areas, 
Sungusungu members have been accused of the same failings frequently attributed to the 
state police: soliciting bribes, wrongful arrest, using excessive force and lacking sensitivity 
when dealing with the public (Cross 2013). Nevertheless, the Sungusungu enabled 
communities to take back power and have heralded a new vision of community responsibility 
for local safety and security while its legalisation has acted as a check on their excesses 
(Heald 2009). 
3.3.2 CBCP in South Sudan 
As an emerging post-conflict state, South Sudan does not have adequate capacity and 
structures to deal with organised crime and criminality and this hampers her state and 
nation-building endeavours (Mbugua 2012). The adoption of community policing as a CBCP 
approach tends to be favoured by some stakeholders in South Sudan to address the issue 
of insecurity. These include the South Sudan Police Service and other local and international 
actors. 
 
The framework for CBCP is set out in the 2009 South Sudan Police Act. However, currently 
there is no common understanding or definition of community policing in South Sudan. It is 
spoken of in terms of Police Community Relations Committees or voluntary community 
police officers. In the South Sudan context, CBCP could therefore be understood as having 
an institutional approach and philosophy, as well as an auxiliary or supplementary police 
capacity at the local level.  
 
It is not uncommon to experience problems with implementing community-based security 
reforms in a post-war context like South Sudan. In its post-war history, South Sudan has a 
range of actors, both local and international, with different understandings and definitions of 
CBCP, especially community policing. The obviously complex context in which it is 
implemented also presents a difficult hurdle. 
3.3.3 CBCP in South Africa 
A common type of CBCP in South Africa is the neighbourhood watch scheme which 
operates in partnership with the South African Police Service, the Community Policing 
Forum, local authorities, and private security service providers. The National Crime 
Prevention Centre in South Africa (2000) produced a manual to guide local authorities in 
designing their own crime prevention plans. The design includes sections such as the need 
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for a community crime prevention strategy, the state of communication infrastructure and 
community participation, and how to plan and implement a crime prevention strategy. 
 
Baker (2002) submitted that the challenges of the state police´s inadequate resources, 
training and institutional accountability has made non-state policing thrive in South Africa, as 
citizens have had to make their own provisions to guarantee their right to freedom and 
personal security. But non-state policing has been only slightly effective in complementing 
the efforts of the state police in ensuring safety in the communities. It has also led to more 
social isolation in communities, where non-state volunteers have discriminated against 
minorities, and to a rise in illegal possession of weapons, leading to more violence. It has 
also negatively affected criminal justice and promoted inequality in access and adjudication 
of security and justice. 
 
The effectiveness of CBCP in South Africa seems to be undermined by the tension in the 
expected roles of the police and CBCP actors. The police would want CBCP actors to be 
intelligence gatherers while the actors would wish for a more amenable police force 
(Brogden and Nijhar 2005). Mutual interracial suspicions and cleavages as well as crises of 
legitimacy also compromise the effectiveness of CBCP in South Africa (Brogden and Nijhar 
2005; Owen and Cooper-Knock 2014). 
 
In summary, CBCP practices in Africa are indeed widely prevalent with evidence that they 
sometimes have a positive impact on security in the society. CBCP actors, especially 
vigilante groups, provide intelligence and join the police in crime fighting. They are 
sometimes quickly mobilised in times of emergency (Olaniyi 2005; Fourchard 2008; Hills 
2008; Van Der Spuy and Röntsch 2008; DFID 2010; Holmer 2014). In fact, in many 
communities, local vigilantes have won the local legitimacy that the police seem to have lost 
(Hills 2008; Pratten 2008). However, there is evidence to suggest that CBCP often performs 
below the expectations of both government and citizens in Africa. One of the major failures 
of CBCP in many African countries is that while they may be effective in reducing petty 
thievery and even homicides and armed robbery, in many cases they replace these crimes 
with others, notably mob justice and a general abuse of citizens’ rights (Baker 2002; Alemika 
and Chukwuma 2004; Brogden and Nijhar 2005). In addition to this, some CBCP often 
isolate segments of the community – foreigners, those from other ethnic groups - and even 
provoke the use of violence (Baker 2008). Some actors, especially vigilante groups, have 
become security threats in themselves and sometimes include criminals in their ranks (IRIN 
2008; Adigwe 2013; Al-Akhbar 2013; Holmer 2014). 
 
4  Models, practices and reasons for CBCP 
effectiveness 
In the section, we present the general findings and then proceed to explain why CBCP is 
effective in some communities and not in others. 
4.1 Community-based crime prevention practices in Ibadan, Nigeria 
There is wide prevalence of community-based crime prevention practices in Ibadan, 
organised and managed by residential associations also called community associations, 
community-development associations, residents’ associations or sometimes, landlords’ 
associations. It is rare to find a neighbourhood where this kind of association does not exist. 
This wide prevalence is reflected in the responses to our survey: 95.8 per cent knew about 
the neighbourhood association in their community. 
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Each association has its unique story of origin but most of them emerged when early settler-
neighbours realised that ‘no one can survive in this [jungle] alone’ (Association leader, Male, 
Sasa). Before government legislated that such associations be formed, neighbours had 
already taken the initiative to form them. The age of each association is roughly the same as 
the age of the neighbourhood. While some have elaborate structures with a written 
constitution, others have rather shifty structures and adopt ad hoc approaches to issues.  
 
The association is usually headed by an executive council of between 8 and 15 members 
with a chairman or president, vice chairman, secretary, treasurer, financial secretary and a 
women’s leader. Some include a youth leader in the executive. Membership of the 
association is mandatory for everyone residing in the neighbourhood under its jurisdiction. 
 
The general meeting is held monthly – usually first or last Saturday of each month – while 
the executive meeting is held twice a month. Attendance at meetings is mandatory in some 
places for both landlords and tenants, and in other places, for landlords only – but a monthly 
contribution of money is mandatory for both in all cases. The average membership size is  
50 but a member can mean a person or someone in representation of a building. If there is a 
building housing multiple households, such a building is expected to send a representative 
to the neighbourhood meeting; it is not mandatory for every household in a multiple-
household building to be represented. This explains why although they all pay levies, only 
62.1 per cent of our respondents considered themselves members of their community 
association. 
 
Most associations are self-funded, relying almost solely on levies from members. Levies 
vary from community to community. In some communities, contribution is per person 
whereas in others it is per building. In the latter case, the association values a building and 
decides how much the owner pays per month as a security (or as development and security) 
levy. This ranges from 200 Naira (US$1) to 5,000 Naira (US$25). Shops, private schools 
and similar commercial outfits attract higher levies because ‘they attract bad people [thieves, 
burglars] and so they must be more properly watched’ (Association leader, female, Onireke). 
About 95 per cent of residents considered the levies they paid to be fair. Some associations 
however get substantial support from businesses within their jurisdiction: an example is one 
for which a big business outfit donated a meeting hall as part of their corporate social 
responsibility programme.  
 
The associations engage in what they generally refer to as development activities as well. 
These include installing and maintaining streetlights within their community, repairing roads 
and maintaining gutters, buying and maintaining electricity transformers, and fixing other 
electrical faults in the neighbourhood. They also provide water through boreholes or open 
wells, give financial and emotional support to distressed members, and settle disputes 
among members. However, crime prevention is cited as the most important function of the 
associations: 73.3 per cent of our respondents claimed that their community associations 
had organised crime prevention activities in the previous three months. 
4.2 A mix of models 
The community associations combined the elements of three non-state models of security 
provisioning: private security arrangements, vigilantism and neighbourhood watch. First, the 
communities had guards whom they hire and pay on a monthly basis. The community with 
the fewest number of guards had four while some had as many as ten. In some 
neighbourhoods, such as Old Bodija and Oladele II, the guards ran day and night shifts 
while in others, the guards worked only at night. The guards patrolled or stayed beside the 
entrance and exit gates. All the night guards and most of the day guards carried arms but 
not all of them were registered as staff of a security company. 
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Secondly, communities also invited members of the Vigilante Group of Nigeria to assist their 
guards if there were situations that the guards could not handle. Some communities have a 
retaining arrangement with the vigilante groups while others paid the vigilantes only when 
summoned. In a few communities, the hired guards were members of vigilante groups who 
remitted a part of their income to the group. For some associations, vigilante members are 
preferred to guards who do not have a corporate affiliation because ‘vigilantes are bold and 
they are prepared in terms of arms and also [protective] charms unlike ordinary guards who 
will see armed robbers and flee’ (Female resident, Sasa). 
 
Third, the associations engaged in neighbourhood watches. A resident whose community 
hired night-only guards said, ‘we are all guards during the day. The night guards work during 
the night.’ Among our respondents, 81.5 per cent claimed that they volunteered to watch 
over the neighbourhood. A discussant, who is a retiree, said: 
 
Sometimes you think I am just taking a walk, especially when most people have gone 
to work when the neighbourhood is near empty. I take a walk but I am really looking 
round to know if there are any strange faces. As you entered this street, I saw you 
from afar but you didn’t see me. 
(Discussant, Focus Group Discussion) 
 
There was, however, a more active form of neighbourhood watch especially at night. Most 
community associations had bought whistles for each house. On sighting any strange 
movements, a resident would sound his/her whistle and other residents would pick it up until 
the whole neighbourhood would become one choir of whistles. The whistle blowing could go 
on for over one hour. This not only alerted the guards but also scared the intruders. In other 
communities, members were actually called out to patrol along with guards, in addition to 
and while blowing the whistles. Armed with cudgels, long knives and sometimes pistols and 
guns, men and, occasionally, women engaged in this exercise no matter the time of the 
night. 
 
Communities adopt whatever works for them in their particular contexts. While it is profitable 
to classify CBCP practices based on existing models, attempting to ram them into one clear-
cut model would do much conceptual harm. 
4.3 Communitisation as the overarching strategy 
Community associations embarked on numerous crime prevention activities, including 
constructing gates or iron bars at the entrances and exits to the communities, hiring guards 
and paying them, organising security seminars for members of the community, installing and 
maintaining streetlights, conducting censuses and maintaining a register of residents in the 
community so that strange people are detected and subjected to vigilance, and working with 
the police. Overarching all of these activities is a strategy which can be described as 
communitisation, a process or act of declaring as a ‘community asset or liability’ what 
ordinarily should be a private property or space or even a public government building. This 
strategy plays out in two different forms. 
4.3.1 Communitisation of personal spaces and problems 
In the process of ensuring safety and preventing crime, community associations in Ibadan 
exercised an oversight function over, or even control of, private freedoms, spaces and 
property. The executive council of the associations had a very visible presence and 
significant powers. From the association, landlords have to obtain clearance for, or at least 
register, each new tenant they are bringing into the community. In most places, tenants are 
questioned and asked to explain what prompted them to leave their former residence, and 
are expected to sign up to certain undertakings. Residents are given a form to fill out. There 
are cases of associations expelling tenants whose conducts were deemed capable of 
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compromising the security of the community, and some have done this even without the 
consent of the tenants’ landlords. 
 
In Sasa, the executive council often entered a house with or without the owner’s consent to 
search it or inspect it. There were also cases of houses whose power supply cables were 
disconnected from the electric poles because the members failed to cooperate with the 
community association. 
 
When asked to explain from where such legitimacy was derived, community association 
leaders explained that the land belongs to the community. Mr Olaniregun, a community 
association chair explained: 
 
Each person is the owner of his property but the land belongs to the government, it 
belongs to us all. No one came here with land; we all came here as strangers and 
bought land. The community is the owner of everything. If tomorrow I am no longer 
the leader, I cannot lead people into your house and say we want to search. And our 
people understand; they trust the association. They know it’s for the good of everyone 
that we’re doing this. That’s why they cooperate. 
(Olaniregun, Interview) 
 
During one of our patrols with the members of an association, they noticed the carcass of a 
vehicle which had been parked by the roadside within the community for six years. It was 
thought that criminals might begin to use the carcass as a hideout. The owner was called out 
and given 48 hours within which to remove the carcass or face sanctions. It was learnt that 
two weeks after, the association, having notified the police, paid to tow the carcass to the 
dumping ground outside the community. 
 
Owners of vacant and bushy lots of land were usually put under pressure to clear the lots so 
as to prevent them fromalso being used by robbers as hideouts. Parents whose children 
were considered to be violent, lazy or just deviant were pressured as well to find a solution 
to the problem. In Onireke, the community association would take offence at the sight of any 
child who is of school age but not in school, and parents of such a child would be 
questioned. 
 
You see, it is our way of ensuring security today and in future. If these kids are not 
sent to school, what will happen to our kids that we send to school? Our association 
doesn’t mind assisting you financially for a period if that is needed to send your child 
to school. 
(FGD Discussant, female, Onireke) 
 
The example was given of a day-and-night guard who lived in the gatehouse of a particular 
house with his school-age son. The community insisted and assisted him financially to enrol 
the boy in a public school. 
 
At one of the meetings we attended, Alhaji Bidemi, a founding member of a 35-year old 
association summed it up thus: 
 
We all have our rights and privileges but the interest of the community is uppermost.  
If the community says, ‘don’t sleep’, you don’t. In some communities, men and women 
come out to patrol all night. Yes, that is the community saying you dare not sleep and 
they obeyed. 
(Alhaji Bidemi, FGD Discussant) 
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An event in Sasa showed that Alhaji Bidemi’s comment might have been exaggerated but 
not totally untrue. A group of youths was planning their ‘Carnival’ in February 2015. A 
‘carnival’ is an all-night street party involving drinking, loud music, and some fracas resulting 
in injuries and occasionally deaths. Youth groups try to outdo one another on the wildness of 
their ‘carnival’. The Sasa youth group had printed banners and invitation and put up street 
decoration without informing the association. The association called them up for tough 
questioning and then declared: ‘there can never be a carnival in this neighbourhood.’ 
 
How did residents respond to this seemingly overbearing disposition of the associations? 
Focus group discussants described the demands and actions of the associations as 
moderate and acceptable. Noting that inspections are not a regular event, a female 
discussant in Old Bodija asked rather rhetorically: 
 
What would you rather choose? Privacy without security or security without privacy? 
And what is privacy? They are not coming to look into our pots of soup or nakedness 
or something like that. They want to see if you’re harbouring criminals or bombs … you 
know, with Boko Haram now. And they’re taking all these troubles for our sake. If they 
want to inspect the house, that’s a good thing. 
(FGD Discussant, female) 
  
Refusal to allow a community association to inspect one’s house was seen by the residents 
as an indictment: ‘it means you have something to hide.’ 
 
Whereas the practice of communitising personal spaces is widespread, it is by no means 
universal. In the super-rich parts of Onireke, a community within a community, private 
spaces are respected. In fact, CBCP is hardly of any effect there as everyone provided his 
own security by providing high fences round the house and a fulltime guard hired by each 
landlord or occupant. The chairman of Onireke residents’ association lamented the lack of 
cooperation from the elite.  
 
Communitising personal spaces is also not without tension. Occasionally community leaders 
find residents who insist on their rights to privacy or would not cooperate in some other 
ways. Such matters have ended in one of three ways: the association leaders used 
persuasion, most of the time behind the scenes, until the person is co-opted. If this did not 
work, they meted out some punishment to the resident ranging from disconnecting their 
house from electricity mains or instructing the guards to not open the community gates for 
them – such a resident has to open the gates for themselves, which in some communities 
was considered an insult. Third, and in a few cases, the association took the person to the 
police and after that the court. A commonly brandished instrument was the government 
decree that made it mandatory for residents to be actively involved in and cooperate with 
their community associations or to risk a fine and imprisonment for two months (Oyo State 
Government 1996; Nigerian Tribune 2012).1 Very often, the associations won. 
 
The corollary to communitisation of private spaces is communitisation of personal problems. 
Community associations stand by members who suffer misfortunes, especially active 
members. They also arbitrate between members who have disputes because ‘we are one; a 
member’s peace is everyone’s peace’ (Male resident, Old Bodija).They even assume 
caretaker roles for the property of deceased members, returning the proceeds to the 
deceased’s family members. 
 
However, where the communitisation of private problems was most obvious was in matters 
involving the police. Most Nigerians avoid the police as much as possible – even when they 
                                                        
1  That military decree was revisited by the civilian government in 2012 and passed into law. The original fine of 200 Naira 
(US$1) was upgraded to between 5,000 Naira (US$25) and 10,000 Naira (US$50) (Nigerian Tribune 2012). 
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are in the right. It is generally believed that if one reported a problem to the police, he or she 
would be treated as the prime suspect, and there was no estimating the number of times 
one would be asked to return to the police station over a matter about which one might have 
just have a passing witness. One could even be detained. Therefore, when residents noticed 
a problem, they preferred to report to the community association leaders first, who then 
reported the case to the police.  
 
When asked to whom they would prefer to report a security problem, 93.4 per cent of our 
respondents said they would rather report to the community association while 6.6 per cent 
would report to the police. The FGD discussants explained that this was preferred because 
the police could not detain an association but they could detain an individual. It was safer to 
report to the association. The association would take the matter up ‘as if it is a community 
matter.’ 
 
In Sasa, a resident noticed that a long truck had been parked by the roadside for days and 
bluebottles were gathering around it. He peeped in and found that the truck driver was in it 
dead and decomposing. According to him, he notified the landlord who notified the police 
and sanitary officers. The corpse and the truck were removed immediately. He explained: 
 
If I had reported to the police, they’d have detained me until an autopsy is performed to 
prove that I was not the one who killed the driver. But you see, they know the chairman 
(of the community association) and they know he is the community; he speaks for the 
community. He cannot run away and they cannot detain him. They have a cordial 
relationship. 
(FGD Discussant, male) 
 
Reporting to the chairman who in turn reported to the police also had the added advantage 
of attracting a reasonably rapid police response. When an individual lodged a distress call, 
residents believed, the response from the police was always slow if it ever came. 
 
Communitising personal problems sometimes appeared like shielding members from the 
law. However, association leaders emphasised the point that they do not stand by members 
who were accused of criminal misconduct but would rather work with the police to ensure 
that justice was done. A particularly recurrent example was that of children of members or 
leaders of the association who were accused of property theft: the association refused to 
stand by such people. 
 
The success of CBCP does not result from a consultative leadership that respects residents’ 
fundamental right to privacy and follows democratically laid down principles. Rather, it 
requires the presence of a strong association or a strong leader who at times ignores 
boundaries, coerces, threatens and also protects as occasions demand. 
4.3.2 Communitisation of abdicated state roles and duties 
The police were an important part of the CBCP: they counselled community association 
leaders; they held monthly Police-Community Relations Committee (PCRC) meetings with 
communities, and conducted regular patrols at the request of communities.2 They arbitrated 
between community associations and their members in the case of any disagreement that 
communities could not solve internally. Despite this, only 25.4 per cent of our respondents 
had seen the police talk to residents about crime prevention in the previous one year, while 
only 24.6 per cent had seen the police attend community meetings. 
 
                                                        
2  PCRC meetings are held for clusters of community associations at a centrally located police station or a designated 
hall; they are not held for each community association. 
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Residents, police and community leaders described the relationship between the 
associations and the police as cordial; ‘we are partners in progress.’ Chairmen described 
situations in which they had called the police deep in the night over security breaches and 
how they had responded immediately. The police also described the kind of assistance they 
received from the community associations, such as receiving intelligence reports. 
 
However, the interaction between the police and the community association should be 
understood as abdication by the state of its primary function of funding the police force, and 
the effort by communities to assume this role – in other words, to communitise them as if 
they are now the responsibility of the communities. Basic statutory roles of government, 
which had been neglected, were now being taken up by the communities. Communities tax 
their members to raise funds to build police posts. In fact, Oladele II attempted to build a 
standard police station but was prevented to do so by the police authorities who, instead, 
approved a police post. Different but contiguous communities teamed up to build PCRC 
meeting halls and on a monthly basis contribute money at PCRC meetings to support the 
police. 
 
Not only this, each time the police was called in distress, community association leaders 
knew that they had to pay for the fuel for the patrol vehicles to run. This is in addition to the 
regular contributions that enable the police to maintain regular scheduled patrols of the 
communities. An association leader explained: 
 
I got a phone call about 2am three days ago that robbers had entered our area 
[community] from the NISER end beside the stream. I called the police at Alakara. 
Those ones don’t waste time. They came immediately and chased the bad boys up to 
IITA, firing shots after them. Now, you call officers at that time, will you then ask them 
to go away empty handed? They don’t manufacture fuel; they’re police not NNPC.3 
(Interviewee) 
 
When asked why he called Alakara police station, and not Sasa police station that was 
nearer, he explained that his association had ‘a relationship with Alakara.’ Another chairman 
said, ‘Each time I called, I more or less have to say, we’ll give you fuel.’ 
 
The police officers were not as forthcoming on this as the chairmen of the associations were. 
They complained about the poor state of patrol vans, the inadequate number of serviceable 
ones, and lack of money to fuel and maintain them. They acknowledged the critical support 
of the community associations ‘in terms of logistics’ but were quick to insist that although 
they had a ‘relationship’ with some communities, they would gladly serve any community 
whether or not such a community supported the police. 
 
Monies and other resources expended in maintaining a ‘relationship’ with the police were 
disclosed at executive meetings of the associations but not at the general meetings. In some 
communities, all of this is shrouded in secrecy, meaning that both the police and the 
community leaders have doubts about the legality of communitising the abdicated role of the 
State and the implications of this for the role of the police as neutral arbiters and law 
enforcement agents. 
 
Did the ‘relationship’ sometimes impede the performance of the police? Police officers 
complained a lot about some community associations ‘taking the law into their hands.’ When 
the guards apprehended suspected robbers, they would often beat them mercilessly and 
sometimes tie them up before handing them over to the chairman. Sometimes, the 
suspected thief was a mere drunk, loiterer or a mentally ill wanderer who was found outside 
                                                        
3  NNPC, Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation, is the official agency in charge of fuel production and marketing in 
Nigeria. 
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at the wrong time. Guards did not often bother to investigate or they lacked the skills to do 
so. There is no mention of reprimand or punishment for such association chairmen or night 
guards. A police officer said: 
 
We always plead with them; we explained to them that until the court pronounces 
someone guilty, you cannot punish the person; you cannot take the law into your 
hands. Maybe this is the most difficult problem we have with the community 
associations and their guards. 
(Police officer, Interview) 
 
The existence of a ‘relationship’ was the likely reason that the police were reluctant to 
prosecute community association leaders or their guards for excesses. 
 
Rapid police response to distress calls from chairmen of associations is not automatic. It 
comes with ‘a relationship’ nurtured by the associations’ readiness to step into the law 
enforcement and crime prevention role abdicated by government, that of funding the police. 
This should be understood in the context of the larger state failure which makes CBCP 
necessary in the first place. The same process goes on with the provision of some other 
public goods such as electricity and potable water: communities provide and maintain 
electric cables, electric poles and insulators as well as power transformers to ensure 
community members have access to electricity, just as they also dig boreholes and open 
wells to supply water. They also repair roads and construct gutters. 
4.4 Effectiveness of the CBCP practices 
The foregoing section describes the process and the dynamics of the CBCP in Ibadan. It is 
important to assess how effective the citizens considered the CBCP practices to be, in terms 
of crime prevention. To do this we asked them to assess the safety of their neighbourhoods, 
state if they had been victim of a criminal act in the previous three months, and state if 
certain criminal acts were a problem in their neighbourhoods. In an earlier survey, we asked 
if they considered the CBCP practices responsible for the safety of their neighbourhood. 
Nearly 63.0 per cent of the citizens considered their communities very safe while only 2.1 
per cent considered them very unsafe. 
 
Figure 4.1 Citizens' perception of safety of their communities (n=240) 
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Focus group discussants were no less in agreement about the safety of their communities. 
To investigate further, we asked them to state the most serious problems in the 
communities. Interestingly, only 8.3 per cent of the respondents considered insecurity to be 
the most difficult problem of their neighbourhood. The most frequently mentioned problem 
was the poor condition of local roads (25.8 per cent). The problem of insecurity was the fifth 
most frequently mentioned, coming after unemployment (8.8 per cent). 
 
Figure 4.2 Most difficult problem in the neighbourhood as identified by residents 
(n=240) 
 
 
Residents were asked to state if they had been victims of any type of crime in the previous 
12 months. Of the respondents, 84.6 per cent stated that they had not been victims of a 
criminal act within the stated period. In addition to this, only 11.7 per cent considered home-
based robbery to be a problem in their neighbourhood; only 10.8 per cent considered 
robbery outside of the house a serious problem while only 9.2 per cent considered shootings 
to be a serious problem. 
 
Figure 4.3 Percentage considering specific criminal acts as serious problem in their 
neighbourhood (n=240) 
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Criminal acts were considered by very few as serious problems. When asked to compare 
the crime rate in their communities to that in neighbouring communities, 82.9 per cent of 
respondents considered the crime rate in their communities to be less. 
 
A majority of the respondents (72.7 per cent) considered their CBCP to be responsible for 
the low level of crime and high level of safety in their communities. FGD discussants were 
quite emphatic about this. However, some complained about petty property theft, especially 
theft of clothes hanging on the line, power generating sets and domestic animals, which they 
believed would be difficult to stop. 
 
We investigated the possible influence of social capital, communication infrastructure, 
participation and collective efficacy on the perceived effectiveness of CBCP. First we 
describe the levels of these variables before addressing their significance. 
4.4.1 Social capital 
Community residents see others from their immediate communities as being more 
trustworthy than people from outside their communities. This is evident as shown in Figure 
4.4 where more respondents described people who live in their communities as very 
trustworthy (n=90; 37.5 per cent) and somewhat trustworthy (n=100; 41.7 per cent) but fewer 
respondents described them as not very trustworthy (n=29; 12.1 per cent) and untrustworthy 
(n=6; 2.6 per cent). Conversely, fewer respondents described the Nigerian people generally 
as being trustworthy (n=18; 7.5 per cent) with more respondents describing them as not very 
trustworthy (73; 30.4 per cent) and untrustworthy (45; 18.8 per cent). 
 
Figure 4.4 Residents’ perception of trust among their neighbours 
 
 
 
 
Residents had a positive perception of their neighbours in terms of mutual care and degree 
of cooperation that existed among them in the communities. Table 4.1 shows that  
109 (45.4 per cent) and 66 (27.5 per cent) respondents agreed and strongly agreed 
respectively that the people in their communities were willing to help their neighbours. The 
two values added together (n=175; 72.9 per cent) represent an overwhelming majority for 
those who had a positive perception of their neighbours compared to only seven  
(2.9 per cent) and 23 (9.6 per cent) who strongly disagreed and disagreed, respectively, that 
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their neighbours were willing to help others in the communities. The majority of the 
respondents also agreed (n=116; 48.3 per cent) and strongly agreed (n=73; 30.4 per cent) 
that their communities were united. Only three (1.3 per cent) and 15 (6.3 per cent) strongly 
disagreed and disagreed, respectively. Respondents also demonstrated a willingness to 
leave their children or their house keys with their neighbours or allow their kids to eat in their 
neighbours’ houses. As presented in Table 4.1, for example, 105 (43.8 per cent) and 57 
(23.8 per cent) of the respondents agreed and strongly agreed that they would allow their 
kids to stay with their neighbours whereas only seven (2.9 per cent) respondents strongly 
disagreed. Similarly, only 15 (6.3 per cent) respondents strongly disagreed with the option of 
leaving their house keys with their neighbours but 86 (35.8 per cent) and 60 (25.0 per cent) 
respondents agreed and strongly agreed to leave their house keys with their neighbours. 
These represent 60.8 per cent of the respondents. 
 
Table 4.1 Residents’ perception of mutual care and cooperation among their 
neighbours 
 
 
 
Almost all of the residents (n=226; 94.2 per cent) expressed their willingness to attend social 
functions such as the naming of babies, weddings and burials organised by their neighbours. 
Only seven (2.9 per cent) of the respondents clearly said that they were not inclined to 
attend social functions of their neighbours. Seventy (29.2 per cent) and 49 (20.4 per cent) of 
the respondents agreed and strongly agreed to ask their neighbours for financial assistance, 
food items and other forms of help in times of dire need. 
4.4.2 Communication infrastructure 
Communication infrastructure is high and sufficient in the communities selected for the study 
(see Table 4.2). A majority of the respondents agreed (n=107; 44.6 per cent) and strongly 
agreed (n=117; 48.8 per cent) that their community associations met sufficiently enough 
whereas only one (.4 per cent) and 13 (5.4 per cent) strongly disagreed and disagreed, 
 Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Undecided Agree Strongly 
Agree 
DK DA Total 
The people of the 
community are willing to 
help their neighbours 
7 
(2.9%) 
23 
(9.6%) 
34 
(14.2%) 
109 
(45.4%) 
66 
(27.5%) 
1 
(.4%) 
- 240 
(100.0) 
This Community is very 
united 
3 
(1.3%) 
15 
(6.3%) 
32 
(13.3%) 
116 
(48.3%) 
73 
(30.4%) 
1 
(.4%) 
- 240 
(100.0) 
I can leave my kids with 
my neighbours 
7 
(2.9%) 
30 
(12.5%) 
29 
(12.1%) 
105 
(43.8%) 
57 
(23.8%) 
4 
(1.7%) 
8 
(3.3%) 
240 
(100.0) 
I can leave my house 
keys with my neighbours 
15 
(6.3%) 
46 
(19.2%) 
30 
(12.5%) 
86 
(35.8%) 
60 
(25.0%) 
1 
(.4%) 
2 
(.8%) 
240 
(100.0) 
I can allow my kids to eat 
at my neighbours’ house 
17 
(7.1%) 
52 
(21.7%) 
33 
(13.8%) 
91 
(37.9%) 
42 
(17.5%) 
4 
(1.7%) 
1 
(.4%) 
420 
(100.0) 
I can allow my 
neighbours’ kids to come 
and watch TV in my 
house 
8 
(3.3%) 
14 
(5.8%) 
11 
(4.6%) 
130 
(54.2%) 
73 
(30.4%) 
4 
(1.7%) 
 
- 420 
(100.0) 
I feel free to attend social 
functions of my 
neighbours (e.g. naming 
of babies, weddings and 
burials) 
1 
(.4%) 
6 
(2.5%) 
7 
(2.9%) 
126 
(52.5%) 
100 
(41.7%) 
- - 420 
(100.0) 
I feel free to ask my 
neighbours for financial 
assistance, food items, 
etc. 
33 
(13.8%) 
47 
(19.6%) 
39 
(16.3%) 
70 
(29.2%) 
49 
(20.4%) 
1 
(.4%) 
1 
(.4%) 
420 
(100.0) 
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respectively. Over 54 per cent of the respondents agreed that their community associations 
shared sufficient information among community members, 33.8 per cent strongly agreed 
while only two (.8 per cent) respondents strongly disagreed. More than 91 per cent of the 
respondents confirmed that collective communication in their communities helped members 
to solve security problems. Only 7.5 per cent of the respondents disagreed with this. 
 
Table 4.2 Residents’ assessment of sufficiency and relevance of information 
exchange in the community 
 
 
Members of the selected communities attended different types of meetings. They employed 
diverse means of making suggestions or lodging complaints and shared phone contacts 
among themselves. These are the components of their communication infrastructure. As 
presented in Table 4.3, meetings of the community associations (n=170; 70.8 per cent) were 
those most frequently held. This was followed by landlords’ meetings with tenants (14.2 per 
cent). Meetings of tenants within a house (n=21; 8.8 per cent) and meetings of association 
with police (n=12; 5.0 per cent) were not held frequently. Face-to-face communication 
(n=184; 76.7 per cent) was the most frequently employed means of sorting issues among 
community members while communication through Short Message Service (SMS) was the 
least used means (n=5; 2.1 per cent). Phone calls (n=28; 11.7 per cent) and letters (n=14; 
5.8 per cent) were also used occasionally by members to lodge complaints or make 
suggestions. About 31 per cent of the respondents had the phone numbers of some of their 
neighbours while 25.8 per cent of them have the phone numbers of most of their neighbours.   
 
  
 Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Agree Strongly 
Agree 
Invalid Total 
My community association 
meets often enough 
1 
(.4%) 
13 
(5.4%) 
107 
(44.6) 
117 
(48.8%) 
2 
(.8%) 
240 
(100.0) 
My community association has 
a conducive meeting hall/place 
3 
(1.3%) 
57 
(23.8%) 
94 
(39.2%) 
86 
(35.8%) 
- 240 
(100.0) 
My community association 
discusses issues that are 
relevant to my needs 
1 
(.4%) 
43 
(17.9%) 
121 
(50.4%) 
75 
(31.3%) 
- 240 
(100.0) 
My community association 
shares sufficient information 
2 
(.8%) 
27 
(11.3%) 
130 
(54.2%) 
81 
(33.8%) 
- 240 
(100.0) 
My community association 
welcomes suggestions from 
residents 
2 
(.8%) 
26 
(10.8%) 
110 
(45.8%) 
101 
(42.1%) 
1 
(.4%) 
420 
(100.0) 
Information from residents to 
the association is sufficient 
3 
(1.3%) 
44 
(18.3%) 
120 
(50.0%) 
70 
(29.2%) 
3 
(1.3%) 
420 
(100.0) 
Information from one resident 
to another is sufficient 
3 
(1.3%) 
48 
(20.0%) 
131 
(54.6%) 
54 
(22.5%) 
4 
(1.7%) 
420 
(100.0) 
My community association 
shares timely information 
1 
(.4%) 
31 
(12.9%) 
142 
(59.2%) 
64 
(26.7%) 
2 
(.8%) 
420 
(100.0) 
Our communication in this 
community helps us to solve 
security problems 
- 18 
(7.5%) 
119 
(49.6%) 
100 
(41.7) 
3 
(1.3%) 
420 
(100.0) 
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Table 4.3 Communication infrastructure in the communities 
 Meeting Types Frequency Percentage 
Which type of meeting 
do you always have? 
Meeting of the community association 170 70.8% 
Meeting of association plus police 12 5.0% 
Meeting of tenants within a house 21 8.8% 
A landlord meeting with tenants 34 14.2% 
Invalid 3 1.3% 
 Communication means   
What means do you 
use to make 
suggestions or lodge 
complaints to the 
community 
association? 
Face-to-face 184 76.7% 
Phone calls 28 11.7% 
Letters 14 5.8% 
SMS 5 2.1% 
None 7 2.9% 
Invalid 2 .8% 
 Phone Numbers Possessed by Residents   
I have the numbers of Some of my neighbours 76 31.7% 
Many of my neighbours 62 25.8% 
Few of my neighbours 66 27.5% 
None of my neighbours 32 13.6% 
Invalid 4 1.7% 
Total 420 100.0% 
 
It is likely that the availability of communication infrastructure created opportunities for the 
exchange of ideas, networking and other forms of communication needed for the CBCP to 
succeed.  
4.4.3 Community participation 
The level of community participation was high among the residents. More than half of the 
respondents (n=133; 55.4 per cent) confirmed that in the last three months up to the time 
this survey was conducted, they had attended at least one meeting of their community 
association. Similarly, 48.8 per cent of the respondents said that in the last three months, 
they had done some volunteer work for their community associations. 
 
Table 4.4 Residents’ level of community participation 
 Efforts Frequency Percentage 
In the last three months, have you put in a physical 
effort to solve a problem in the community? 
No 57 23.8% 
Yes 179 74.6% 
DA 12 5.0% 
INAP 1 0.4% 
Invalid 8 3.3% 
 Donating materials   
In the last three months, have you donated 
materials for the work of your community 
association? 
No 56 23.3% 
Yes 180 75.0% 
DA 4 1.7% 
INAP 1 0.4% 
Invalid 5 2.1% 
Total 420 100.0% 
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Those who had contributed to solve a problem in the community in the previous three 
months were 74.6 per cent while 75.0 per cent had donated materials for community work. 
 
To what extent do social capital, community participation and communication infrastructure 
influence the effectiveness of CBCP? To answer this question, we calculated the average 
score of each community on each of the factors. As Figure 4.5 shows, social capital, 
community participation and communication infrastructure were high in the studied 
communities. 
 
Figure 4.5 Social capital, community participation and communication infrastructure 
and CBCP effectiveness 
 
 
 
We found that these factors were relatively high in both effective CBCP communities and 
ineffective CBCP communities. This, therefore, makes it implausible to argue that these 
factors explain the effectiveness of CBCP. Whereas they form the pillars of community 
cohesion and thus contribute to the effectiveness of community projects, in this case, CBCP, 
they do not explain the (in)effectiveness of CBCP. A wide variation in the levels of these 
factors across the two blocks of communities would have suggested otherwise and so would 
have made a further probe worthwhile. 
4.5 Explaining ineffectiveness: a comparison of two CBCP practices 
Not all CBCP practices are effective and in some communities, the performance is too poor 
to be ignored. The uneven performances presented an opportunity to investigate causal 
factors in the effectiveness of CBCP through a carefully set up comparative design. For this 
purpose, we compared an effective CBCP with an ineffective one paying attention to the 
context, dynamics and the actors. The chosen communities were Sasa and Oja’ba. 
 
Both communities have CBCP dating back to 35 years in Sasa and to pre-colonial times in 
Oja’ba. Both have erected iron bars that serve as gates and hired night-only guards. Each 
community association holds its general and executive meetings monthly but emergency 
meetings are more common in Oja’ba than in Sasa. In both communities, residents 
contribute money to finance their CBCP practices and projects. In Sasa the least is 300 
Naira (about US$1.5) per house; in Oja’ba it is 500 Naira (about US$2.5) but both 
community associations complained about residents who did not want to pay the monthly 
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levies. Both associations work with the police for crime prevention and send representatives 
to the Police-Community Relations Committee (PCRC) meetings. 
 
Compared to other communities that we studied, Sasa and Oja’ba are both densely 
populated and fall within a comparable socio-economic profile: most residents are petty 
traders and artisans. The youth population is also large in both communities and the rate of 
unemployment in both communities is high but it might be slightly higher in Oja’ba. 
 
Despite this level of comparability, the CBCP practices produce widely varied outcomes. In 
fact, whereas 86.7 per cent of Sasa residents considered their CBCP to be effective; only 
26.7 per cent of Oja’ba residents thought theirs was.4 
 
Table 4.5 A comparison of CBCP performances in Sasa and Oja’ba 
 Sasa Oja’ba 
% that had witnessed a criminal activity in the last week 0% 22.5% 
% that knew of a criminal hideout in their community 26.7% 80.0% 
% that considered their community unsafe 0% 40.0% 
% that knew where hard drug spots are in their community 6.7% 73.3% 
% that claimed to know where to buy stolen property in their 
community 
0% 6.7% 
 
Focus group discussants at Oja’ba painted the picture of totally inept CBCP practice while 
describing their experiences: 
 
Ah! This place is unsafe o! It is God that’s been protecting us. Shops are burgled 
constantly, houses are set on fire and cars are stolen regularly. Street fighting is 
regular with harming [injuries] and sometimes death. My shop has been burgled twice 
in [the last] three weeks. 
(Discussant, FGD) 
 
In Sasa, however, the case was different: 
 
… because the association is very up and doing, we have a security team that handles 
security matters and because they have been effective, this place [community] has 
been very safe. We’ve not had problems on security. 
(Discussant, FGD) 
 
In an attempt to account for this variation in the performances, we examined the progression 
between the CBCP activities of Sasa community association and the outcomes, and then 
compared that with that of Oja’ba. 
 
 
 
                                                        
4  The second wave of quantitative data collection in Oja’ba was discontinued because of extortion and threat to the lives 
of field workers. Therefore, we relied on the first round of quantitative data for both Sasa and Oja’ba in this section of 
the report. We were, however, able to conduct participant observation, interviews and focus group discussions in both 
communities. 
Association 
communitises 
spaces and 
roles
'Relationship' 
with police is 
nurtured
More patrols, 
increased 
police 
presence
Report, arrest, 
punish/ 
prosecute
Peace, safety 
etc; association 
popular
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In all the other communities with effective CBCP, the structure and progression is the same. 
However, in Oja’ba, the progression is truncated at some point. Community leaders are 
unable to totally control the residents and communitise spaces. They manage to develop a 
‘relationship’ with the police and get the police to patrol but they are reluctant to report 
offenders to the police or to supply police with intelligence.  
4.5.1 History, culture and the role of multiple lordships 
The inability of the community leaders in Oja’ba to fully communitise spaces and report 
offenders to police deserves some interrogation. Possible explanations could be the large 
population of the community, low level of formal education, large droves of unemployed 
citizens, poor communication infrastructure and lack of participation by the community. 
Marenin (2009) has also identified some factors that may compromise the overall 
effectiveness of policing in Sub-Saharan African states. Some of these constraints are 
perennial political instability, widespread insecurity, identity-based and violent conflicts, 
corruption, class and status differences, weak civic society organisations, and quest for 
personal survival by most of the citizens. However, we did not find any of these possible 
explanations to be plausible. 
 
Residents reported a high level of participation at community association events and 
activities. They attend meetings and take an active part in development projects. One of our 
interviewees explained that though he was a building representative and that he did not 
have to attend meetings, he did attend regularly so as to keep himself abreast of events in 
the neighbourhood. Leaders of the association also did not complain of low level of 
participation. 
 
With reference to population and youth unemployment, we found that both Sasa and 
Agbowo were as densely populated as Oja’ba and yet they had effective CBCP. Both 
communities also hosted large youth populations with a high level of unemployment. 
Fourchard (2003) following after Agboola, Olatubara and Alabi, (2001) describes both Oja’ba 
and Sasa as urban slums with high levels of illiteracy and poverty. The population figures of 
the different local governments in which the two communities are found also do not support 
the overpopulation explanation: the Akinyele Local Government Area where Sasa is found 
had a population of 211,359 in a landmass of 575 km2 while the Ibadan South West Local 
Government Area where Oja’ba is located has 283,098 to a landmass of 805 km2 (Oyo State 
Government 2015) 
 
We also did not find evidence of poor or dysfunctional communication infrastructure in 
Oja’ba. Across the communities, communication infrastructure was significantly related to 
the effectiveness of CBCP. In Oja’ba, however, there was little to suggest that the 
communication infrastructure was poor. Members of the community reported regular 
meetings, conducive meeting places and a communication context that enabled regular and 
free exchange of useful information most of the time. 
 
We come to meetings a lot and people come many; association meetings are 
sometimes like parties. Sometimes we have up to 80 per cent of the expected number 
of people [at meetings]. People come to meetings so that when they need help and 
assistance, they can get it. 
(Discussant, FGD) 
 
For the explanation of leaders’ inability to communitise space and work with the police 
successfully, we looked at the history of the community and the power balances in it. 
 
Oja’ba, located in the ancient part of the city, is a traditional community of indigenous Ibadan 
people. Traditional settlements follow kinship and family ties as relatives settled in large 
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compounds known as Agbo-Ile, houses built in circles. Each Agbo-Ile is headed by a Baale 
(compound head) and its members are related at least remotely to members of the next 
compound. Each Baale serves for as long as he lives; there is no term of office and removal 
from office is rare. Most community associations in the traditional parts of the city were 
ancient compound-based cooperatives or ‘meetings’ that were rebranded as community 
associations in line with government directives. An interviewee described the associations 
as ‘handed over by our fathers who inherited them from their fathers’. They are headed 
mostly by the Baale who cannot be removed from office for any reason. 
 
Kin-based settlement type has implications for CBCP. Among the Yoruba, it is unacceptable 
to report your kin to the police or to any outsiders. It is often said, a kii ti kóòtù de s’òré, 
meaning: we do not return from the law court and remain friends. Reporting a kin to the 
police or giving out intelligence information on him is an offence to tradition and ancestral 
relationships. Instead of reporting offenders in Oja’ba to the police, leaders ´call them to 
order’, during meetings which is a poor alternative. 
 
This contrasts with Sasa where nearly everyone is a settler and the community association 
was formed 35 years ago to meet security and development needs. Leaders of association 
serve terms of office and can be returned or removed if found incapable. There are no 
kinship ties and the police is regarded not as an intruder into existing familial ties but as law 
enforcer and arbiter. 
 
To the problem posed by kin-based settlement should be added the tradition of violent street 
fighting among the indigenous Ibadan people. There is a popular saying and belief that 
street fighting is a tradition of Ibadan (Ìjà ìgboro l’orò Ibadan). Traditional festivals, religious 
festivals, youth carnivals, sports competitions, among others, are traditionally accompanied 
by violent street fights. The reason for this is difficult to find but it is generally acknowledged 
that this is not a recent phenomenon. A resident averred: 
 
Those houses and cars were burnt over there. You can see them. They were burnt 
during the last Egungun festival. That happens every time; no one can do anything 
about it. 
(Discussant, FGD) 
 
This certainly is beyond the control of the community associations, odd and dangerous as it 
is. These outbursts often overwhelmed the community associations. 
 
The third explanation for the impotence of the community association in Oja’ba is the 
existence of multiple lords or ‘big men’. These are politicians, transport union leaders and 
gang leaders who have and maintain groups of followers who oftentimes break the law. 
These leaders, sometimes called godfathers, have a greater influence than community 
association leaders and are known to quickly secure the release of their followers when 
arrested by the police. 
 
The foregoing situation undermines greatly the effectiveness of CBCP in Oja’ba. The 
truncated pathway for the Oja’ba CBCP is depicted below: 
 
 
 
More patrols, 
increased police 
presence 
More crime & 
troubles; 
association 
popularity 
wanes 
Association 
communitises 
spaces & roles  
‘Relationship’ 
with police is 
nurtured 
Report, 
arrest, 
release 
Do not 
report/ 
‘call to 
order’ 
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Possibly at some point, the association communitised spaces and roles, and maintained a 
relationship with the police. There was an increased police presence and patrols but for 
kinship reasons, the association was often reluctant to supply to the police intelligence which 
could lead to the arrest of offenders. Rather, they dealt with offenders ‘in-house’. Even when 
offenders were reported to the police and subsequently arrested, their ‘godfathers’ got them 
released and they returned to the community to cause more trouble and taunt or even attack 
community leaders. Therefore, whether or not an offence or criminal act was reported, the 
offender returned to the community. This showed the community that the association was 
impotent and decimated the association’s popularity. Consequently, the respect, legitimacy 
and resources needed to communitise spaces and roles waned, and the association and its 
CBCP lost importance. Police patrols became mere noisemaking and siren blowing. Cases 
of crime and lawlessness only multiplied in such an atmosphere. 
 
On the one hand, the most important cause of the effectiveness of CBCP is the ability of the 
community associations to legitimately communitise private spaces, problems and assume 
abdicated state roles. On the other hand, explanations for the ineffectiveness of CBCP must 
go beyond social capital, poverty, unemployment and population density into more 
fundamental and more plausible possibilities. In the case of Oja’ba, a conjuncture of cultural 
and contextual factors combine to weaken the ability of the association to communitise 
spaces, problems and roles and thus weakens the overall effectiveness of the CBCP 
practice. 
 
5 Discussion 
The prevalence of non-state security provisioning is amply documented in the literature 
(Baker 2002; Alemika and Chukwuma 2004; Brogden and Nijhar 2005; Hills 2014). What 
has been a subject of controversy is whether these non-state arrangements work and how 
they work. Our study demonstrates that community-based crime prevention (CBCP) 
practices work effectively in most parts of the city of Ibadan: residents considered them to be 
the cause of community safety and low levels of crime. The main strategy employed by the 
community associations that drive CBCP is communitisation – a process of appropriating for 
the community private spaces and freedoms as well as private problems and concerns, and 
also assuming the role of funding the police which is a core function of the state. The 
success or failure of a CBCP arrangement depends on this causal factor. 
 
As confirmed by much of the literature (Baker 2002; Baker 2008; Buur and Jensen 2004; 
Fourchard 2008; Holmer 2014), the inability of the state to provide security is an obvious 
reason for CBCP practices. However, the current study leads us to conclude that the tension 
between state and non-state actors in security provisioning (Baker 2002; Baker 2010a; 
Baker 2010b; Denney 2015) is not universal. In the CBCP practices that we studied, there is 
a cordial and complementary relationship between the state, specifically the police, and the 
community associations that drive the practices. This is, expectedly, not totally devoid of 
tension, but the complementarity largely overwhelms what may appear to be tension. Hills 
(2014) describes this kind of relationship in Kano, Nigeria, between the police and culturally 
legitimate non-state but state-supported security groups, such as the Hisba, stressing the 
importance of informal relationships and the political and professional skills of the officers. 
The police in Ibadan, like Hills’ (2014) in Kano, recognise the importance of these informal 
associations and groups and would rather deploy ‘political … skills [than] aggressive raids’ 
(Hills 2014). 
 
A major concern expressed in the literature about non-state security provisioning is its lack 
of accountability which is often used to explain abuse and the recourse to mob justice (Baker 
2002; Baker 2008; Baker 2010a; Alemika and Chukwuma 2004). The current study, while 
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confirming the presence of some excesses, evokes the need to raise some critical 
questions. The community development associations that drive CBCP in Ibadan openly 
appropriate private rights, such as the right to privacy, and convert them into community 
rights; yet, members of the community gladly relinquish these rights in exchange for effective 
security provisioning. The question thus has to be tackled: whose duty is it to define what is 
an abuse, and what is not? On the other hand, how much is too much in offering some rights 
as currency for the right to security? 
 
The place of social capital, community participation and communication infrastructure 
(Putnam 2000; Kim and Ball-Rokeach 2006) on the perceived effectiveness of CBCP was 
considered. Studies have shown correlations between these variables and crime rate 
reduction (Maxwell, Garner and Skogan 2011; Rukus and Warner 2012; Ansari 2013; 
Abdullah et al. 2015). However, the current study shows that of the three variables, only 
communication infrastructure was significantly related to the effectiveness of CBCP. Most of 
the communities, including those with ineffective CBCP, exhibited high levels of social 
capital, communication infrastructure and community participation. While there is no basis to 
suggest that social capital and participation do not lead to effective CBCP, there is a basis to 
suggest that the presence of these variables alone, even in good quantity, does not produce 
effectiveness of CBCP. What seems to be the most important factor is the presence of a 
dominant actor who garners these resources together towards fulfilling the objects of a 
CBCP practice. 
 
Do high population density and poverty limit the effectiveness of CBCP? Both the literature 
(Shaw 1949; Hsieh and Pugh 1993; Nolan III 2004; Harries 2006; Shichor, Decker and 
O’Brien 2006; Ouimet 2012; Lightowlers 2015) and intuition strongly suggest this to be the 
case. However, our spatial comparison of two cases that were similar in density and poverty 
level turns out a counterintuitive finding that contradicts this. These two largely similar 
communities turned out widely varied levels of CBCP effectiveness. However, since we did 
not compare two communities with varied population density and poverty levels, our findings 
do not completely rule out the place of population density and poverty in the success of 
CBCP. In the cases that we studied, historical, cultural and human factors combine to 
weaken the capacity of associations to deploy those communitisation strategies which cause 
CBCP to succeed in other communities. 
6 Conclusions, policy implications and 
recommendations 
To the question of whether CBCP works, the answer should be in the affirmative in view of 
the evidence that it does indeed reduce crime rate and improves neighbourhood safety. 
However, that is only as far as the group driving it can legitimately appropriate for itself 
certain powers and responsibilities within the community. 
‘The future is non-state’, declares Baker (2010a) in his argument about the ubiquity of non-
state actors in the security sector. While strongly agreeing with Baker on this, one should be 
cautious in suggesting that the state and donor agencies should intervene to facilitate the 
emergence of non-state actors. Rather, policies should be sensitive to the strengths and 
resources in the communities and help communities to nurture and maximally deploy these. 
Killingray’s (1986) position is relevant here. The author cites Afigbo’s example of the political 
organisation of the Igbo village group in south-west Nigeria that maintained their cultural 
uniqueness and refused to break down or fall into disorganisation under British colonial rule. 
The CBCP situation in Nigeria is one that presents opportunities to donors to demonstrate 
their ability to support what is locally owned, instead of labouring to attract local ownership to 
what they have imported. 
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Based on the present findings, it is recommended that parallel conceptions of state police 
crime prevention activities and community-based crime prevention practices be revisited. 
Societal safety may be better ensured by collaborative efforts between state police and 
community-based actors. This is even more needed in the African context where the number 
of state police is exceedingly low. Specific trainings on intelligence gathering should also be 
integrated into police-community relations. Police and community need to work together and 
use their respective strengths to prevent and tackle crime. This is particularly important 
because police presence in some parts of the country is quite limited, so working as parallel 
entities is ineffective. Joint training on intelligence gathering is one way of bringing them 
together.  
 
It is important at the same time to engage in projects and adopt policies that reduce poverty 
and check population growth. Urban renewal projects should create more motor-able roads 
and make police patrols easier. Yet, these alone will not reduce crime rates and increase 
neighbourhood safety. Community-based crime prevention should be strengthened and 
formally supported. Where policies exist to support CBCP, such as in Oyo State, they should 
be implemented, while a policy on CBCP should be enacted where one does not exist. 
Actions that weaken the power of multiple lords should be embarked upon in particular. This 
should be one area where force and aggressive raids might be needed to protect CBCP 
practices. Effectiveness of CBCP is determined by a number of factors which currently are 
outside of the scope of existing regulatory frameworks and policies on community safety and 
security in Nigeria. There is need for legal frameworks and policies to address the process of 
communitisation which contributes significantly to effectiveness of CBCP. This would ensure 
that CBCP practices are done legally.  
Community-based crime prevention has been shown to make people and the entire 
community safer. This is particularly the case where members of the community take the 
lead on identifying resolving local problems, and managing public spaces, and do not rely 
entirely on the state for support in these areas. In trying to promote community-based 
models in other parts of the country, the Ministry of the Interior and its development partners 
should actively help facilitate the process of defining clear community roles and 
responsibilities so that groups can maximise their strengths and resources.  
 
The Nigerian Government and its police service should organise regular training for 
community leaders in order to minimise the friction sometimes caused by a transition to 
community-based crime prevention. Capacity building could focus on diplomacy skills and 
negotiation technique as well as more general instruction on democratic ideals and the 
drivers of crime.   
 
In some cases, community-based crime prevention has been known to come under the 
control of local groups who wield parallel power in the area. These not only include criminal 
elements such as gang leaders, but heads of transport unions as well. With this in mind, the 
police should focus its efforts on reducing the power and influence of these groups. Such 
actions may include surveillance, arrests or more aggressive raids. 
 
To boost the effectiveness of police patrols that support community-based crime prevention, 
the Government should prioritise the construction of more roads in the communities. These 
should be regularly maintained so that they do not deteriorate.  
 
The effectiveness of community-based crime prevention is determined by a number of 
factors, many of which fall outside the scope of existing regulatory frameworks and policies 
that deal with safety and security in Nigeria. Given that community-policing models have 
been shown to work, specific legal frameworks and policies should be developed to facilitate 
the process of communitisation. 
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Annexes 
 
 
Annex 1 Questionnaire for First Round of Data Collection in 18 Communities 
 
Effectiveness of Community-based crime prevention activities in Ibadan 
Name of community/neighbourhood: residents’ structured interview 
 
1) For how long have you lived in this neighbourhood? 
2) Do you take part in the activities of the neighbourhood association? 
3) In which of the activities do you take part?
a. I attend the meetings 
b. I contribute money regularly 
c. I supervise development projects 
d. I take part (physically) in development 
projects 
e. I volunteer to watch over the 
neighbourhood 
f. I supervise security projects 
g. I represent the community during meeting 
with police representatives (PCRC) 
h. Any other activities. 
4) When last did any of these take place in your community?
 
Within the 
last one 
week 
Within the 
last one 
month 
Long 
time 
ago 
Don't 
remember 
a. Somebody’s property in this neighbourhood got missing – eg 
okada, car, clothes, phones etc. 
    
b. Somebody’s house in this neighbourhood was burgled during the 
day 
    
c. Somebody’s house in this neighbourhood was burgled during the 
night 
    
d. Somebody was kidnapped in this neighbourhood     
e. Armed robbers attacked someone in this neighbourhood     
f. Street fight among young people     
g. Use of illegal drug     
h. Gun shots in the neighbourhood     
i. Forceful extortion of money or property from residents     
j. Physical assault/attacks people     
k. Rape     
5) How often do the following things happen in this community?
 Every time Occasionally Rarely Can't 
say 
a. Stealing of property     
b. Burglary during the day     
c. Burglary during the night     
d. Kidnapping     
e. Armed robbery     
f. Street fight/gangsters’ fight/ gangsterism     
g. Use of illegal drug     
h. Gun shots in the neighbourhood     
i. Forceful extortion of money or property from residents     
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 Every time Occasionally Rarely Can't 
say 
j. Physical attacks/assault on people     
k. Rape     
6) In this community, are there places where criminals can hide, such as uncompleted 
buildings, thick bushes or any hiding places? 
7) How would you describe this community in terms of safety? 
a. Very safe  b. Safe  c. Unsafe d. Very dangerous 
8) If your community is safe, what is the cause of the safety? [Choose one] 
a. The activities of the neighbourhood/landlord association 
b. The activities of individuals who protect their own houses 
c. Any other: 
9) Are you sometimes afraid for your own safety in this neighbourhood? 
10) Are you sometimes afraid for the safety of your family/friends/visitors in this 
neighbourhood? 
11) Are you afraid of going out in the night in this community?  
12) Why or why not? 
13) How will you describe the level of crime in this community? 
a. Very low b. Low  c. High  d. Very High 
14) If the level of crime in your community is low or very low, would you say it is because of 
the activities of the neighbourhood association? 
15) In this neighbourhood, are there places where:
a. People sell India hemp? 
b. People smoke Indian hemp? 
c. People sell hard drugs? 
d. People use hard drugs? 
e. People sell/buy stolen property 
such as handsets laptops
16) Does your neighbourhood association have any security/crime prevention measures? 
17) Which of these does your neighbourhood association perform?
a. Employing security 
men/Olóde/OPC/vigilante 
b. Erecting security gates/bars 
c. Installing cameras 
d. Educating members on security matters 
e. Working with or having meetings with 
police 
f. Installing and maintaining street lights 
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18) Do you think the activities of your neighbourhood association are effective in 
reducing crimes in your neighbourhood? 
19) If you notice a strange movement in your neighbourhood or witness an ongoing 
crime, or suspect a criminal to whom do you report? 
20) Why? 
21) Age 
22) Gender 
23) Name (optional):  
24) Status:  
a. Landlord/landlady 
b. Landlord’s/landlady’s family or relative 
c. Tenant 
d. Tenant’s family or relative 
e. Others 
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Annex 2 Questionnaire for Second Round of Data Collection 
 
A study of community-based interactions in Nigeria 
 
This survey is to help us learn your views, values and experiences on interaction in communities in Ibadan. Your 
collaboration is important. There are no right or wrong answers and the survey is confidential. We appreciate your 
cooperation. Thank you. 
  
NC. Questionnaire number           /__/__/__/ DE.  
EC. Surveyor name MU. Local Govt Area: 
S. Supervisor/__/__/ CB. Community/neighbourhood: 
FA. Application date   /__/__/__/__/ UR. Urban [   ]  Rural [   ] (Tick √ one) 
 
 
General Data:  
SE. Sex 
1. Male   2. Female 
EC. Marital Status 
01 Single   07 Just living together 
02 Married 05 Divorced  
03 Widowed 06 Separated  
 
ED. Age: ______ full years. 
P1. In your opinion, what is the most serious problem facing your community/neighbourhood? (ONE OPTION) 
Lack of water 1 Bad Government 17 
Poor condition of roads 2 Environmental problems 18 
Lack of recreation facilities 3 Migration 18 
Corruption 4 Drug trafficking 20 
Lack of loan facilities for business 5 Gangs 21 
Crime 6 Poverty 22 
Unemployment, lack of jobs 7 Popular protest (Strikes, road closures, etc.) 23 
Delinquency 8 Poor health services 24 
Drug addiction 9 Insecurity  25 
Economic problems 10 Problem of transportation 26 
Problems in the education sector 11 Violence 27 
Extortion  12 Poor housing conditions 28 
Poor electricity supply 13 Too much noise 29 
High cost of living 14 There are no problems in this neighbourhood 70 
Shootings 15 Others 77 
Loitering on the streets 16 DK 88 
  DA 98 
 
P2. In the past 12 months, have you attended a town meeting or municipal council session? 
(1) 
 
 
 
Yes (2) No (88) DK    (98) DA 
 
Now to change the subject Yes No DK DA 
P3. In the last twelve months have you contributed to help solve a problem in your community? 1 2 88 98 
P4. Have you donated money or materials to help solve any problem in the community or neighbourhood? 1 2 88 98 
P5. Have you helped with your own work or labour? 1 2 88 98 
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I am going to read a list of groups and organizations. Please tell me if you attend meetings of these organizations: at least once a week, 
once or twice a month, once or twice a year, or never. 
 once a 
week 
once or 
twice a 
month 
once or 
twice a 
year 
Never DK DA INAP 
P6. Of a religious group? 1 2 3 4 88 98  
P7. Of an association of parents of the school? 1 2 3 4 88 98  
P8. Of a committee or board of community development? 1 2 3 4 88 98  
P9. Of a labour union?  1 2 3 4 88 98  
P10. Of a political party? 1 2 3 4 88 98  
P11. Of a NGO? 1 2 3 4 88 98  
P12.  Of an organization of professionals? 1 2 3 4 88 98  
P13. Meetings promoted by your neighbourhood/community 
board? 
1 2 3 4 88 98  
P14. How often do you attend cleaning activities of your 
neighbourhood/community? 
1 2 3 4 88 98  
P15. Cultural activities in your neighbourhood/community? 1 2 3 4 88 98  
P16. The practice of any sport, as a player? 1 2 3 4 88 98  
P17. [only to women] Meetings of associations or groups of 
women or housewives? 
1 2 3 4 88 98 99 
 
P18. Talking about trust, how would you describe the people who live in your neighbourhood or community? 
(1) very trustworthy (2)somewhat trustworthy (3)not very trustworthy (4)Untrustworthy (88) DK (98) DA 
P19. Generally speaking, would you say that you can trust most people or that one has to be very careful in dealing 
with others? 
(1) You can trust most people  (2) One has to be very careful when dealing with others 
(88) NS (98) NR 
 
P20 When I needed, my neighbours helped me (1) Agree (2) Undecided (3) Disagree 
 
P21. Generally speaking would you say Nigerian people are very trustworthy, somewhat trustworthy, not very 
trustworthy or untrustworthy? 
(1) trustworthy (2) somewhat 
trustworthy 
(3)   not very 
trustworthy 
(4) untrustworthy 
(88) DK (98) DA     
 
 Yes No DK DA INAP 
P22A. Is there a community association or board in your neighbourhood / 
community? (eg Residents’ Association, Landlord Association) 
1 0 [Go to P 
27.] 
88 98 99 
P23. Are you a member of that association or board? 1 0 88 98 99 
CP24. In the last three months, have you attended a meeting called by the 
association or board of neighbours? 
1 0 88 98 99 
CP25. In the last three months, have you done any volunteer work for this 
association or board?  
1 0 88 98 99 
CP26. In the last three months, have this association or board of residents of this 
neighbourhood promoted crime prevention activities, such as safety measures for 
the neighbourhood or other activities? 
1 0 88 98 99 
CP27. Is there any other association or institution that is promoting programs for the 
prevention of crime and violence in this neighbourhood/community? 
1 0 88 98 99 
 
P28. How much confidence you have in the work 
done by the following bodies? 
trustworthy somewhat 
trustworthy 
not very 
trustworthy 
Untrustworthy DK DA 
P28A. The churches/mosques 4 3 2 1 88 98 
P28B. The Armed forces 4 3 2 1 88 98 
P28C. The Independent National Electoral 
Commission 
4 3 2 1 88 98 
P28D. The President of the Nation 4 3 2 1 88 98 
P28E. The Parliament  4 3 2 1 88 98 
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P28. How much confidence you have in the work 
done by the following bodies? 
trustworthy somewhat 
trustworthy 
not very 
trustworthy 
Untrustworthy DK DA 
P28F. The Supreme Court 4 3 2 1 88 98 
P28G. The National government  4 3 2 1 88 98 
P28H. National Human Rights Commission 4 3 2 1 88 98 
P28I. The Police 4 3 2 1 88 98 
P28J. Fed. Ministry of Youth Development 4 3 2 1 88 98 
P28K. The municipal government 4 3 2 1 88 98 
P28L. Local government violence prevention 
council  
4 3 2 1 88 98 
P28M. Elections in Nigeria 4 3 2 1 88 98 
P28N. The political parties 4 3 2 1 88 98 
P28O. The Media 4 3 2 1 88 98 
P28P. The NGO´s 4 3 2 1 88 98 
 
P29. How interested are you in politics? (1) A lot (2) Some (3) A little (4) None (88) NS (98) NR 
 
P30. In general, how satisfied are you with the way 
dem works in Nigeria? 
(1)very satisfied (2)satisfied (3) dissatisfied (4)very 
dissatisfied 
(88) DK (98) DA 
P31. How much does the federal government represent your interests and benefit you as a citizen? 
(1)A lot (2)Some (3) Little (4)None (88) DK (98) DA 
 
P32. How much do the local government represent your interests and benefit you as a citizen? 
(1)A lot (2)Some (3) Little (4)None (88) DK (98) DA 
P33. In what year did you move here (the neighbourhood, or community)? 
Year  ____/____/____/____/ (88) DK (98) DA 
 
P34. Without counting your relatives, approximately, how many friends do you have living in your neighbourhood / 
community? 
(1) None (3) Between 3 and 
5 
(5) Between 11 
and 20  
(88) DK 
(2) Between 1 and 2 (4) Between 6 and 
10 
(6) More than 20 (98) DA 
 
P34xi: I have the phone numbers of (1) Some  (2) many (3) few (4) none of my neighbours. 
 
P35. Now, I 'm going to read some sentences, for each sentence we would like to know if you strongly agree, agree, 
neither agree nor disagree, disagree, strongly disagree. 
 strongly 
agree 
Agree Undecided  disagree strongly 
disagree 
DK DA 
P35A. The people of the community are willing to help 
their neighbours 
5 4 3 2 1 88 98 
P35B. This community is very united 5 4 3 2 1 88 98 
P35C I can leave my kids with my neighbours 5 4 3 2 1 88 98 
P35E I can keep my house keys with my neighbours 5 4 3 2 1 88 98 
P35F I can allow my kids to eat in my neighbours 
house 
5 4 3 2 1 88 98 
P35D I can allow my neighbours’ kids to come and 
watch TV in my house 
5 4 3 2 1 88 98 
P35G I feel free to attend social functions of my 
neighbours (eg naming, wedding, burial etc) 
5 4 3 2 1 88 98 
P35H I feel free to ask my neighbour’s for financial 
assistance, food items etc 
5 4 3 2 1 88 98 
 
P36. I will now ask some general questions about your community. For each phrase we would like to know if it is very 
likely, likely, neither likely nor unlikely, unlikely, very unlikely.  
 very 
likely 
likely Undecided unlikely very 
unlikely 
NS NR 
P36A. Probability that a neighbour do something about it if a 
child runs away from school 
5 4 3 2 1 88 98 
P36B. Probability that a neighbour intervene if a fight breaks 
out in front of his house 
5 4 3 2 1 88 98 
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P36C. probability that a neighbour intervene if a child or 
adolescent is disrespecting an adult 
5 4 3 2 1 88 98 
 
P37. And thinking about this neighbourhood or community where you live, are you very satisfied, satisfied, 
dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied with the state of public spaces ? 
 very satisfied Satisfied dissatisfied very 
dissatisfied 
DK DA 
P37A. Park/public playground 1 2 3 4 88 98 
P37B. Communalhouse 1 2 3 4 88 98 
P37C. Sports court 1 2 3 4 88 98 
P37D. Street lighting 1 2 3 4 88 98 
P37E. Bus stops  1 2 3 4 88 98 
 
P38.What aboutthe state of public schools? 
(1) very satisfied (2) satisfied (3) dissatisfied (4) very dissatisfied 
(88) NS (98) NR     
 
P39. What about the state of the roads? 
(1) very satisfied (2) satisfied (3) dissatisfied (4) very dissatisfied 
(88) NS (98) NR     
 
[One answer for each item] 
P40. In the past 12 months have you adopted any of the following behaviors 
for fear of being a victim of a crime?  
Yes No DK DA 
P40A. Reduced my visits to recreation sites/playgrounds 1 2 88 98 
P40B. Avoided to participate in public events. 1 2 88 98 
P40C. Stopped using of community infrastructure 1 2 88 98 
P40D. Felt the need to change neighbourhood or community 1 2 88 98 
P40E. Avoided using public transportation 1 2 88 98 
P40F. Avoided going out at night 1 2 88 98 
P40G. Stopped visiting relatives and friends 1 2 88 98 
P40H. Limited the shopping places  1 2 88 98 
P40I. Avoidedgoing out alone 1 2 88 98 
P40J. Prevented your underage children to go out 1 2 88 98 
P40K. Made changes in your house(Razor wired, gates, locks, etc.) 1 2 88 98 
 
P41. I will read some of the things that people sometimes say about politicians, the government and I would like you 
to tell me if [read options] 
 strongly agree agree disagree strongly disagree DK DA 
P41A. The government does not care much for 
people like you 
1 2 3 4 88 98 
P41B. Politicians are willing to lie to win the election 1 2 3 4 88 98 
 
P42. Now, changing the subject, have you been the victim of any type of crime in the last 12 months? That is, have 
you been the victim of robbery, burglary, assault, fraud, blackmail, extortion, threats or any other type of crime in the 
last 12 months? 
Yes [Go on]                       (2) No [Go to P45.]                       (88) DK [Go to P45.]                (98) DA [Go to P45.] 
 
P43. Thinking about the last criminal act of which you were a victim, from the list that l will read to you, what kind of 
crime did you experience? 
01 Unarmed robbery without aggression or physical threat 08 Household theft, thieves got into the house while no 
one was home 
02 Unarmed robbery with assault or physical threats 09 Extortion 
03 Armed robbery 10 [Do not read] Other 
04 Physical aggression without robbery 88 DK 
05 Rape or sexual assault 98 DA 
06 Kidnapping 99 INAP (Was not a victim)  
07 Property damage   
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P44. Could you tell me in which place happened the last criminal act of which you were a victim? [Read options] 
01 In your home 05 In another country 
02 In this neighbourhood or community 88 DK 
03 In this town 98 DA 
04 In another town 99 INAP [Was not a victim] 
 
P45. Please tell me if the following conditions are a serious problem, somewhat serious, little serious, nothing serious 
or are not a problem in your neighbourhood or community. 
 serious somewhat 
serious 
little 
serious 
nothing 
serious 
not a 
problem 
DK DA 
P45A. Stains , graffiti or paint on the walls 1 2 3 4 5 88 98 
P45B. Abandoned houses 1 2 3 4 5 88 98 
P45C.Garbage on the sidewalks or streets/by the roadside 1 2 3 4 5 88 98 
P45D. Vacant land/plots/lots with high grass 1 2 3 4 5 88 98 
P45E.Streets or dark places or without street lights 1 2 3 4 5 88 98 
P45G.Youth gangs living in your neighbourhood 1 2 3 4 5 88 98 
P45H. Sale of illegal drugs in your neighbourhood 1 2 3 4 5 88 98 
P45I. People fighting and arguing in the street 1 2 3 4 5 88 98 
P45J.People who insult or annoy people when they walk 
through the streets of the neighbourhood 
1 2 3 4 5 88 98 
P45K.Drunk people on the streets 1 2 3 4 5 88 98 
P45L. Drugged people in the streets (eg indian hemp 
smokers) 
1 2 3 4 5 88 98 
P45M.Robbery at home 1 2 3 4 5 88 98 
P45N.Robbery on people when they walk down the street 1 2 3 4 5 88 98 
P45O.Shootings 1 2 3 4 5 88 98 
P45P. Brawlsor fights between gangs 1 2 3 4 5 88 98 
P45Q. Murders 1 2 3 4 5 88 98 
 
P46A. How safe do you feel in this neighbourhood? 
(1) very safe (2) somewhat safe (3) somewhat unsafe (4) very unsafe (88) DK (98) DA 
 
P47. Do you think that the current level of violence in your neighbourhood/community is greater, equal, or less than 
other neighbourhoods/communities in this town? 
(1) greater (2) Equal  (3) Less  (88) DK (98) DA 
 
P48A. Have you heard of any Violence Prevention Committee this town?  
(1) Yes (2) No (88) DK (98) DA (99) INAP 
 
P49. In the last three months, have you or someone you know attended a meeting called by the Violence Prevention 
Council in this town? 
(1) Yes (2) No (88) DK (98) DA (99) INAP 
 
P50. In the last 12 months, have you seen or heard that any institution has made public works in this  
neighbourhood/community, such as improving street lighting, cleaning activities, construction or repair of streets , 
courts or park? 
(01) Yes                     (02) No                                     (88) DK                                    (98) DA 
 
P51. In the last 12 months, have you seen or heard that a mosque or church has made efforts to improve the living 
conditions of the inhabitants of this neighbourhood/community? 
(01) Yes                  (02) No                                   (88) DK                                    (98) DA 
 
P52. If you were a victim of a robbery or assault how much faith would you have the judicial system will punish the 
guilty? [Read options] 
(1) Much 2) Some (3) Little  (4) None  
(88) DK (98) DA     
 
P53. In the last 12 months, which of the following actions have you seen the Police do in this 
neighbourhood/community... 
 
Now we will talk about how you exchange information in this community. 
 Yes No DK DA 
P53A.Talking to the residents of this neighbourhood 1 2 88 98 
P53B.Attend meetings of residents of this neighbourhood 1 2 88 98 
P53C.Seen the Police performing activities to prevent crime in this 
neighbourhood 
1 2 88 98 
P53D. Relate to children and youth of this  neighbourhood through recreational 
and educational activities 
1 2 88 98 
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P53x1 My community association meets often enough (4) Strongly agree (3) Agree (2) Disagree (1) Strongly 
disagree 
P53x2 My community association has a conducive 
meeting hall/place 
(4) Strongly agree (3) Agree (2) Disagree (1) Strongly 
disagree 
P53x3 My community association discusses issues 
that are relevant to my needs 
(4) Strongly agree (3) Agree (2) Disagree (1) Strongly 
disagree 
P53x4 My community association shares sufficient 
information 
(4) Strongly agree (3) Agree (2) Disagree (1) Strongly 
disagree 
P53x5 My community association welcomes 
suggestions from residents 
(4) Strongly agree (3) Agree (2) Disagree (1) Strongly 
disagree 
P53x6 Information from residents to association is 
sufficient 
(4) Strongly agree (3) Agree (2) Disagree (1) Strongly 
disagree 
P53x7 Information from one resident to another is 
sufficient 
(4) Strongly agree (3) Agree (2) Disagree (1) Strongly 
disagree 
P53x8 My community association shares timely 
information 
(4) Strongly agree (3) Agree (2) Disagree (1) Strongly 
disagree 
P53x9 Our communication together in this community 
helps us to detect and solve security problems 
(4) Strongly agree (3) Agree (2) Disagree (1) Strongly 
disagree 
P53x10 Which type of 
meeting do you always have? 
(1) Meeting of the 
community 
association 
(2) Meeting of 
association plus 
police 
(3) Meeting of 
tenants living within 
a house 
(4) A landlord meeting with 
tenants 
P53x11 What means do you use to make 
suggestions or lodge complaints to the community 
association? 
(1) Face-
to-face 
(2) 
Phone 
calls 
(3) 
Letter 
(4) 
SMS 
(5) 
Social 
media 
(6) e-
mail 
(7) None 
 
P54. In general, you are very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with the performance of the police in 
your neighbourhood/community? 
(1) very satisfied (2) satisfied (3) dissatisfied (4) very dissatisfied 
(88) NS (98) NR     
 
 
 
 
P55. In your opinion this neighbourhood/community is very safe, somewhat safe, somewhat unsafe very unsafe? 
(1) very safe (2) somewhat safe (3) somewhat unsafe (4) very unsafe (88) DK (98) DA 
 
 
P55x1 When security is jointly organised by the community, it works 
better than when it is organised by the individual. 
(4) Strongly 
agree 
(3) 
Agree 
(2) 
Disagree 
(1) Strongly 
disagree 
P55x2 The community association can provide security for me, my 
family and my property better security than I can provide on my own. 
(4) Strongly 
agree 
(3) 
Agree 
(2) 
Disagree 
(1) Strongly 
disagree 
P55x3 I have confidence in the security arrangement made by my 
community association 
(4) Strongly 
agree 
(3) 
Agree 
(2) 
Disagree 
(1) Strongly 
disagree 
P55x3 I’m capable of providing security for myself and my family. (1) Strongly 
agree 
(2) 
Agree 
(3) 
Disagree 
(4) Strongly 
disagree 
P55x4 I’m capable of providing security for myself and my property. (1) Strongly 
agree 
(2) 
Agree 
(3) 
Disagree 
(4) Strongly 
disagree 
 
Now talking about you. 
P56.How do you mainly spend your time? Are you currently… [Read options] 
01 Working  06 Retired, a pensioner or permanently disabled 
to work [End] 
02 Not working, but have a job? [continue] 07 Not working and not looking for a job [End] 
03 Actively looking for a job? [End] 88 DK 
04 A student? [end] 98 DA 
05 Taking care of the home? [End]   
 
 
P57. In this job are you: [Read options] 
01 A salaried employee of the government 05 Unpaid worker 
02 A salaried employee of the private sector 88 DK 
03 Owner or partner in a business 98 DA 
04 Self-employed 99 INAP 
 
P58A. The house where you live in is… [read options] 
01 Rented 04 [Do not read] Other 
02 Owned by you 88 DK 
03 Loaned or shared 98 DA 
04 Owned by your family   
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P59. Into which of the following income ranges does the total monthly income of this household fit, including 
remittances from abroad and the income of all the working adults and children? 
00 No income 
01 Less than N18,000 
02 Between N18,100 and N50,000 
03 Between  N50,100 and N100,000 
04 Between N101,000 and N500,000 
05 Above N500,000 
 
 
P60.  What was the last year of education you completed?=______Year_________________ (Primary, secondary, 
university, post-secondary not university)=________ total number of years [Use the table below for the code] 
 1° 2° 3° 4° 5° 6° 
None 0      
Primary 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Secondary 7 8 9 10 11 12 
University 13 14 15 16 17 18+ 
Post-secondary, not university 13 14 15 16   
DK 88      
DA 98      
 
P61. Do you have any intention of going to live or work in another country in the next three years? 
(1) Yes (2) No (88) DK (98) DA 
 
P62. The salary that you receive and total household income: [Read options] 
01 Is good enough for you and you can save from it 04 Is not enough for you and you are having a hard 
time 
02 Is just enough, so that you do not have major 
problems   
88 DK 
03 Is not enough for you and you are stretched 98 DA 
 
P63. How many people live in your home at this moment______________ (88) NS (98) NR 
Now to finish, could you tell me if you have in your house: [Read Options] 
P63A. Television (0) No (1) Yes (88) DK (98) DA 
P63B. Refrigerator  (0) No (1) Yes (88) DK (98) DA 
P63C. Landline telephone (0) No (1) Yes (88) DK (98) DA 
P63D. Vehicle/car  (0) No (1) Yes (88) DK (98) DA 
P63E. Indoor plumbing (0) No (1) Yes (88) DK (98) DA 
P63F. Electricity (0) No (1) Yes (88) DK (98) DA 
P63G. Computer (0) No (1) Yes (88) DK (98) DA 
P63H. Internet (0) No (1) Yes (88) DK (98) DA 
 
Thank you very much for your collaboration. 
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Annex 3 Instrument for Third Round of Data Collection – Interview 
Questions and Focus Group Discussion (FGD) Questions 
 
Questions for Focus Group Discussion 
 
Screener: Are you aware of your neighbourhood or landlord association? Only those 
who are aware are those to be recruited. 
 
AVOID THOSE WHO FILLED THE QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
1. In what ways are you involved in the activities of your neighbourhood 
association? [Prompt for this]:  
a. I attend the meetings 
b. I contribute money regularly 
c. I supervise development projects 
d. I take part (physically) in development projects 
e. I volunteer to watch over the neighbourhood 
f. I supervise security projects 
g. I represent the community during meeting with police representatives 
(PCRC) 
2. Why do you participate in the activities of the community association? 
3. How do people in your community participate in the activities of the community 
association? 
4. Why is the level of participation high – if it’s high? Why is it low – if it’s low? 
5. How safe would you describe the community? Any criminal activities? 
6. Your community association has security arrangements. Please describe the 
arrangement. 
7. How effective is the security arrangement made by the association? Please 
explain. Examples are important here. 
8. Would you say the safety of your community [if community is safe] is the result of 
the activities of your neighbourhood association? Explain. Examples. 
9. Do you think that your association demands too much money/commitment? 
 
 
Questions for Association Leader 
 
1. How did your association come into existence? Who formed it and when? 
2. What are the roles/functions of your association in this community? 
3. What connections does your association have with traditional authorities such as 
the Baale, magaji etc? 
4. What does your association do to prevent crime and ensure security in this 
community? 
5. Some residents have said that your association is unable to prevent crime in this 
neighbourhood. What is your response to this? Would you say the measures you 
take are effective? Explain. Examples. 
6. What challenges/problems does your association face in ensuring security in this 
community? [Cooperation from members, contributing money etc] 
7. When a security issue arises, what does your association do? 
8. Describe your association’s relationship with the police on security issues. 
9. Comment on your participation in police-community relations committee – PCRC 
10. How do you think government can strengthen your association? 
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Questions for Police Officer 
 
1. Please describe the rate of crime in the area that your station covers. 
2. Please describe the relationship between your station and the landlords’ or 
community associations in this area. 
3. Please comment on your meetings with community associations and your 
discussions at the meetings. 
4. Would you say people prefer to report crimes to you directly or they prefer to go 
through their community associations? 
5. Many communities have security arrangements – such as watchmen, gates, etc. 
What do you think of the security measures that communities take? Are they 
effective etc. 
6. Do you think community associations sometimes violate the law through their 
security arrangements? Examples. 
7. Please suggest ways of improving security in the communities. 
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Annex 4 Assessment of quality of the evidence from existing studies 
 
HIGH (H), MEDIUM (M), LOW (L) 
 
Bibliographic 
Reference 
Quality assessment Indicator Overall 
Strength 
of 
Evidence 
1.  
Defined 
question
? 
2.  
Transparent 
on data 
sources? 
3.  
Clear 
design? 
4.  
Suitable 
method? 
5. 
Do findings 
match 
design? 
6.  
Findings 
contextualised?  
7.  
Logical 
policy 
recomm.? 
1. Abdullah, A., 
Marzbali, M. H., 
Bahauddin, A. 
Tilaki, M. J. M. 
2015. 
H H M H H H M M 
2. Ademowo, A. J. 
2015 
H H H H H H H H 
3. Agbola, T, 
Olatubara, C. O., 
Alabi, M. 2001.  
H H M M H H L M 
4. Alemika, E. E. O., 
Chukwuma, I.C., 
2004.  
H H L M M H L M 
5. Ansari, S. 2013.  H L L L L M L M 
6. Arnstein, S. 1969.  H H H H H H H H 
7. AU (African Union) 
2013.  
M NA NA NA NA NA NA M 
8. Baker, B. 2002.  H H H H H H H H 
9. Baker, B. 2008.  H H H H H H H H 
10. Baker, B. 2009.  H H H H H H H H 
11. Baker, B. 2010a.  H H H H H H H H 
12. Baker, B. 2010b.  H H H H H H H H 
13. Brogden, M., Nijhar, 
P. 2005.  
H M M M M M M M 
14. Brogden, M. 2005.  H H M M M M M M 
15. Bruce, D. 2010.  H L M M M H H M 
16. Burns, D., 
Hambleton, R., 
Hoggett, P. 1994.  
H H H M M H H H 
17. Buur, L, B. and 
Jensen, S. 2004 
H H H H H H H H 
18. Channels TV 2015.  NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
19. Coleman, J. S. 
1988.  
H L M L M M M M 
20. Cornwall, A. 2008.  H H H H H H H H 
21. Crews, A., Crews, 
G. A. 2007.  
H H H H H H H H 
22. Cross, C. 2013.  H H H H H H H H 
23. Cross, C. 2014.  H H H H H H H H 
24. Dammert, L. 2005.  Spanish        
25. Denney, L. 2015.  H H H H H H H H 
26. DFID (2010)  NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
27. Emmenegger, 
Schraff and Walter, 
2014 
H H H H H H H H 
28. Eye Witness News. 
2014.  
NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
29. Fabiyi, O. O. 2006 H H H H H H H H 
30. Fleisher, M. L., 
2000.  
H H H H H H H H 
31. Fourchard, L. 2003.  H L M L H M M M 
32. Fourchard, L. 2008.  H L H H H H H H 
33. Gerring, J. 2012.  NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
34. Harrendorf, S., 
Heiskanen, M., 
Malby, S. [eds.] 
2010.  
H H H H M H H H 
35. Harries, K. 2006.  H H H M M H H H 
36. Heald, S. 2009.  H H H H H H H H 
37. Heald, S. 2000.  H H H H H H H H 
38. Hills, A. 2008.  H H H H H H H H 
39. Hills, A. 2011 H H H H H H H H 
40. Hills, A. 2014  H H H H H H H H 
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41. Hsieh, C., Pugh, M. 
D 1993.  
H H H H H H H H 
42. Institute for Security 
Studies & Africa 
Check 2014.  
L L L H M H H M 
43. IRIN. 2008.  NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
44. Jenkins, S. 2013.          
45. Killingray, D. 1986 H H H H H H H H 
46. Kim, Y. C., Ball-
Rokeach,  
NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
47. Kivoto, E. 2014.  NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
48. Lightowlers, C. L. 
2015.  
H H M H H M H H 
49. Marenin, O. 2009 H H H H H H H H 
50. Maxwell, C. D., 
Garner, J. H. and 
Skogan, W. G. 
2011.  
M H M H H H H M 
51. Mbugua, J. K. 2012.  M H M H H H H M 
52. Michael L. F. 2000.  H H H H H H H H 
53. National Crime 
Prevention Centre, 
2000.  
NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
54. Nero, M. 2010.  M H H H M H H M 
55. Nolan III, J. J. 2004.  H H M H H M H H 
56. Nolte, I. 2007.  M H H H M H H M 
57. Numbeo.com 2015.  L L L L L L L L 
58. Obuah, E. 2010.  M M H H M H H M 
59. Odekunle, F. 2004.  M L H H M H H M 
60. Okafor, C. 2015.  NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
61. Ouimet, M. 2012.  H M M H H M H H 
62. Owen, O., Cooper-
Knock. S. J. 2014.  
H M M H H M H H 
63. Oyo State 
Government 1996.  
NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
64. Oyo State 
Government, 2015.  
NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
65. Premium Times, 
2015.  
NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
66. Putnam, R. D. 2000.  H H H H H H H H 
67. Rukus, J., Warner, 
M. E. 2012.  
M L H H M H H M 
68. Schultz, P. W., 
Tabanico, J. J. 
2007.  
M L H H M H H M 
69. Shadrack, J. 2000.  M L H H M H H M 
70. Shaw, V. B. 1949.  M L H H M H H M 
71. Shichor, D., Decker, 
D. L., OBrien, R. M. 
2006.  
M L H H M H H M 
72. South African Police 
Service. 2015.  
NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
73. South Sudan 
Monitor 2011.  
NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
74. The Economist 
2009.  
NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
75. Ugandan 
Parliament, 2015  
NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
76. UNDP 2014.  M L H H M H H M 
77. UNODC. 2010.  M L H H M H H M 
78. UNODC. 2014.  M L H H M H H M 
79. UNODC. 2013.  M L H H M H H M 
80. Wilcox, D. 199 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
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